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  • Turkey’s main opposition plans European court challenge to chairman’s ouster from CHP leadership

    Turkey’s main opposition plans European court challenge to chairman’s ouster from CHP leadership

    Turkey’s main opposition New Party is preparing an application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) challenging a ruling that removed its leader, Özgür Özel, from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leadership, the ANKA news agency reported Tuesday.

    The petition is still being drafted. The party plans to apply without waiting for Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals to rule on its appeal, arguing that the courts are being used to reshape the country’s main opposition, party officials told ANKA.

    The 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice annulled the CHP’s November 2023 congress on May 21 and ordered Özel and his leadership team removed as an interim measure, reinstating his predecessor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

    The ruling applied the legal concept of “absolute nullity,” meaning the congress at which Özel was elected was treated as legally invalid from the outset.

    The case concerned allegations of vote buying and manipulation at the congress, where Özel defeated Kılıçdaroğlu. Özel and his allies have denied wrongdoing and described the proceedings as political interference.

    The domestic appeal reached the Supreme Court of Appeals on July 17, and its Third Civil Chamber began a preliminary examination on July 26, according to ANKA.

    The European Convention on Human Rights generally requires applicants to exhaust domestic legal remedies before the ECtHR can examine a complaint. ANKA did not explain the legal basis for seeking review before the domestic appeal concludes.

    Özel and 90 other lawmakers left the CHP to establish the New Party on July 24 after efforts to regain control of the CHP failed. The new party began with 91 seats in Turkey’s 600-member parliament, becoming its largest opposition group, while the CHP’s representation fell to 44.

    Before his removal, Özel had led the CHP to first place nationwide in the March 2024 local elections, defeating President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The party retained İstanbul and Ankara and won municipalities in provinces previously dominated by the AKP.

    Özel and his allies accuse Erdoğan’s government of using the judiciary to weaken the opposition.

  • Ailing Turkish prisoner jailed over alleged Gülen links dies after repeated calls for medical release go unheeded

    Ailing Turkish prisoner jailed over alleged Gülen links dies after repeated calls for medical release go unheeded

    A 73-year-old Turkish prisoner convicted over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement died Monday after authorities kept him incarcerated despite his deteriorating health, repeated appeals for his release and warnings that he could die without urgent medical intervention, the TR724 news website reported.

    Abdullah Tırpan died at İstanbul’s Başakşehir Çam and Sakura City Hospital, where he had been transferred from Metris Prison last week. His left leg was amputated below the knee on October 22 due to advanced gangrene, but doctors subsequently considered a second operation to remove more of the limb because the infection had spread farther up his leg.

    His condition worsened following the surgery, and he was transferred to intensive care and placed on a ventilator on Sunday.

    His daughter, Esra Tırpan Yakut, said Sunday that the family had learned of his transfer to intensive care through Turkey’s electronic health records system because they had not been adequately informed about his condition.

    “My father’s heart stopped, and they are keeping it beating with medication,” she said, describing what the family had been told. “They have already intubated him. Please pray for him. There is nothing more we can do.”

    Tırpan’s death came after months of appeals from his family, lawmakers and human rights advocates for the suspension of his prison sentence on medical grounds.

    Despite suffering from diabetes, hypertension, nerve damage and serious circulatory problems, Tırpan had repeatedly been found fit to remain in prison by state medical authorities.

    Turkey’s Council of Forensic Medicine, a state body responsible for assessing prisoners’ fitness to remain incarcerated, concluded on December 17, 2025, that he could continue serving his sentence. Medical boards at Tekirdağ City Hospital reached similar conclusions in May and June 2026.

    The June report documented several chronic illnesses but concluded that Tırpan could manage his daily activities without assistance and did not require the suspension of his sentence. Another examination on October 6 reportedly found no medical obstacle to his continued imprisonment.

    Independent lawmaker Mustafa Yeneroğlu, who visited Tırpan at Metris Prison earlier this month, warned on October 9 that the prisoner could die without urgent medical intervention.

    Yeneroğlu said Tırpan had advanced gangrene, severe discoloration and large open wounds on his left leg. He was unable to stand or meet his basic needs on his own, according to the lawmaker, who questioned medical assessments finding him capable of remaining in prison.

    Tırpan was serving a seven-and-a-half-year sentence for membership in an armed terrorist organization over his alleged involvement in the Gülen movement, inspired by the late Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the movement since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated him as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the investigations as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after a coup attempt in July of that year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the coup attempt or any terrorist activity.

    Tırpan’s daughter appealed on X on October 20 for the suspension of her father’s sentence after doctors obtained the family’s consent to amputate his leg.

    “We are asking for the suspension of his sentence in the name of justice and humanity,” she wrote. “Please help make our voices heard. Our entire family is devastated.”

    On Monday morning, before Tırpan’s death was announced, Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, a lawmaker from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), shared his latest medical report on X and criticized authorities for keeping him incarcerated despite his life-threatening condition.

    “Who is responsible for this?” Gergerlioğlu asked, saying authorities had failed to explain why Tırpan’s sentence had not been suspended.

    The lawmaker said he was taking legal steps against those he held responsible for the handling of the case.

    “Everyone will be held accountable before the courts,” he wrote.

    Under Article 16 of Turkey’s Law on the Execution of Sentences, a prison sentence may be suspended in certain cases involving serious illness or disability when a prisoner cannot sustain life under prison conditions and is not considered a serious danger to society.

    The Justice Ministry says authorities can reopen the medical review process if a prisoner’s health deteriorates, even after an earlier request has been rejected.

    Tırpan, a father of five who worked as a butcher for 55 years in the northwestern province of Tekirdağ, was convicted on August 8, 2019. Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals upheld his conviction on March 7, 2022.

    According to earlier SCF reporting, the evidence cited against him included having shares in a company operating a private school allegedly affiliated with the Gülen movement, attending religious discussion meetings, making charitable donations to the movement, subscribing to the now-closed Zaman newspaper and maintaining an account at Bank Asya, a bank formerly affiliated with the movement.

    The court also cited his decision to send his children and grandchildren to movement-associated schools and his possession of religious publications.

    Tırpan denied the criminal allegations.

    Since the coup attempt in 2016, the Turkish government has accepted such activities as having an account at the now-shuttered Bank Asya, one of Turkey’s largest commercial banks at the time; using the ByLock messaging application, an encrypted messaging app that was available on Apple’s App Store and Google Play; and subscribing to the now-shut-down Zaman daily or other publications affiliated with members of the movement as benchmarks for identifying and arresting alleged followers of the Gülen movement on charges of membership in a terrorist organization.

    He was first arrested in August 2016 and spent approximately 19 months in pretrial detention before being released pending the outcome of his legal proceedings. He was imprisoned again in February 2025 following the finalization of his sentence.

    Tırpan’s death comes amid longstanding criticism of Turkey’s treatment of seriously ill prisoners. Human rights organizations have repeatedly warned that delays in medical treatment and decisions by the Council of Forensic Medicine finding seriously ill inmates fit to remain incarcerated can put their lives at risk.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • Turkey jails journalist Mehmet Yılmaz over alleged Gülen links

    Turkey jails journalist Mehmet Yılmaz over alleged Gülen links

    A Turkish court has jailed journalist Mehmet Yılmaz, a former editor at newspapers shut down by the government following a coup attempt in 2016 over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement, the state-run TRT Haber news website reported.

    Police detained Yılmaz, whom the authorities had been seeking for a decade, along with Abdullah Ilık, convicted on terrorism charges over alleged Gülen links, and Serdar Uluocak, a dismissed police officer, during raids in four İstanbul districts. The two other men were also jailed.

    Yılmaz previously worked as an editor at the Bugün daily and held various positions at the Zaman newspaper before becoming editor-in-chief of the Özgür Düşünce newspaper.

    Following a July 2016 coup attempt, Turkish authorities shut down more than 160 media outlets by emergency decree and jailed scores of journalists, many over alleged links to the Gülen movement.

    Police accused Yılmaz of using ByLock, an encrypted messaging app, once widely available on Apple’s App Store and Google Play, that Turkish authorities claim was used as a secret communication tool for Gülen supporters.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdoğan as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after the coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the coup attempt or any terrorist activity.

    Ilık had been sought by authorities for three years and had previously been sentenced to more than six years in prison for membership in an armed terrorist organization over alleged links to the Gülen movement.

    The report did not specify the charges against Uluocak or whether he had been previously convicted of any crime.

    According to the latest figures from the justice ministry, more than 127,000 people have been convicted of alleged links to the movement since 2016, with 10,485 still in prison and legal proceedings ongoing against 83,404 individuals.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • Thousands protest media crackdown in Turkey

    Thousands protest media crackdown in Turkey

    Thousands rallied in İstanbul and Ankara on Saturday against what they described as growing pressure on journalists in Turkey, including arrests, media shutdowns and the appointment of government administrators to run news outlets.

    Press freedom has been increasingly constrained in Turkey since a failed coup attempt in 2016, with sweeping prosecutions, digital censorship and government accusations that journalists are spreading fake news.

    “Enough!” shouted marchers, mainly journalists, rights activists and opposition party representatives. “We can no longer breathe!”

    On İstanbul’s Asian side, protesters held up photos of jailed journalists, chanting: “We will not be silenced. Enough is enough!” and “We will not bow to pressure”.

    At least 3,000 people attended each protest, according to police counts.

    Recent weeks have seen what rights advocates describe as mounting pressure on independent journalism.

    Eleven journalists have been jailed in the past two months and several media outlets shut down, according to the Turkish Journalists’ Union (TGS).

    Earlier this month, police raided Turkey’s most-watched news channel, Halk TV, halting broadcasts and installing a government-appointed administrator.

    The takeover was the latest move against media outlets seen as critical of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government.

    It followed the blocking of leading digital news outlet T24’s website and social media accounts over what Turkish officials described as “LGBT propaganda”.

    ‘Intimidation’

    “This gathering is not simply about standing up for journalists,” veteran journalist Zafer Arapkirli told Agence France-Presse after the İstanbul protest.

    “It is also about defending respect for society’s right to access information and news through journalists and independent media,” said the columnist for the BirGün daily.

    Arapkirli, who himself faces lawsuits, said the response and determination to resist must grow as the pressure intensifies.

    “What the regime wants is to intimidate, silence and frighten society through such pressure — by arresting individual journalists, seizing media outlets, banning news coverage and blocking access to social media,” he said.

    “We must show that we will not allow this to happen.

    “We have done so up to now. I believe we are now moving towards demonstrating this determination on a much larger scale”.

    TGS President Gökhan Durmuş said the nature of “the government’s attacks” on the media had changed.

    “If we look at the recent restrictions, access bans and trustee appointments, they have targeted some of the most widely followed and watched broadcasters, news channels and media platforms,” he told AFP.

    “We are seeing a system emerge in which everything is uniform: one voice, one source of news, one centralised operation,” he said.

    ‘Let us do our job’

    In Ankara, protesters chanted against censorship and called for the release of jailed journalists.

    “Today’s protest was important both because it brought journalists together to make their voices heard and because it defended citizens’ right to access information,” T24 journalist Gökçer Tahincioğlu told AFP in Ankara.

    “Journalists are determined to get one message across: we want to practise journalism, and we want to be able to do so freely,” he said.

    The government has repeatedly denied that journalists are arrested or imprisoned for doing their jobs.

    At the Ankara protest, a letter from jailed BirGün journalist İsmail Arı was read to the crowd.

    “I am being held in prison for no reason other than doing my job as a journalist. Days are being stolen from my life,” Arı wrote from Sincan prison on the outskirts of Ankara.

    “We will defend journalism to the very end. Take your hands off us, comply with the constitution and let us do our job.”

    Arı was jailed pending trial on October 21 for the second time in seven months, accused of publicly disseminating misleading information following a complaint by former broadcasting watchdog chief Ebubekir Şahin. He was also investigated on suspicion of insulting a public official.

    © Agence France-Presse

  • Turkish teacher facing possible cancer recurrence jailed again over alleged Gülen links

    Turkish teacher facing possible cancer recurrence jailed again over alleged Gülen links

    A former Turkish teacher who underwent extensive treatment for advanced cancer has been jailed again over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement 13 days after his release, preventing him from undergoing a medical examination for a possible recurrence of the disease, the TR724 news website reported.

    Mehmet Daylak, who has been assessed as 86 percent disabled under Turkey’s medical disability classification, indicating a severe loss of bodily function, was taken into custody on October 7, a day before he was scheduled to undergo a PET scan, according to his wife.

    The Gaziantep 2nd High Criminal Court sentenced Daylak to more than seven years in prison on September 24 for membership in an armed terrorist organization over alleged links to the Gülen movement but ordered his release pending appeal. His conviction is not yet final.

    Daylak was arrested on May 5, 2025, as part of an investigation into the alleged restructuring of the Gülen movement.

    His wife said recent MRI and CT scans had shown abnormalities suggesting the cancer might have returned. After his release in September, Daylak visited Hacettepe University Hospital in Ankara, where a PET scan was scheduled for October 8.

    Police detained Daylak in the central province of Aksaray following a prosecutor’s objection to a court order for his release. His wife said the family had submitted medical reports and requests for examinations to the authorities but had been unable to secure his release. Daylak is currently being held at Aksaray Prison.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdoğan as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after a coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the coup attempt or any terrorist activity.

    Daylak was diagnosed with testicular cancer in 2014, which later progressed to stage four and spread to several parts of his body. According to his wife, he underwent multiple surgeries, intensive chemotherapy and a stem cell transplant. His treatment included the removal of his left kidney, gallbladder and part of his liver.

    Daylak also suffers from diabetes and gout, which sometimes leave him unable to walk for extended periods, his wife said. She expressed concern that his health could deteriorate further in prison and called for uninterrupted access to medical examinations and treatment.

    Pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) lawmaker and human rights defender Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu criticized the decision to return Daylak to prison despite his serious health problems, accusing authorities of disregarding the health of seriously ill prisoners and adding to overcrowding in prisons.

    Following his cancer treatment, Daylak was appointed as a mathematics teacher in 2015 through a government recruitment program for people with disabilities and began working in Osmaniye.

    Daylak was first jailed in 2017 over alleged links to the Gülen movement and released seven months later on health grounds. He was subsequently sentenced to more than eight years in prison on terrorism charges based on activities including depositing money in Bank Asya, a now-closed bank linked to the movement. The Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, and the case remains pending.

    According to the latest figures from the justice ministry, more than 127,000 people have been convicted of alleged links to the movement since 2016, with 10,485 still in prison and legal proceedings ongoing against 83,404 individuals.

  • 19 more jailed in investigation targeting Süleymanlılar religious community

    19 more jailed in investigation targeting Süleymanlılar religious community

    A Turkish court has ordered the pretrial detention of 19 people in the latest phase of a financial crimes investigation targeting individuals linked to the Süleymanlılar religious community, the DHA news agency reported on Friday.

    Five others were released under judicial supervision after 24 suspects were brought before a court following questioning by police and prosecutors.

    The decisions follow the fifth round of raids in the investigation, led by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Police searched 28 homes and 16 workplaces across 12 provinces after prosecutors issued detention warrants for 38 people.

    Twenty-two people were initially detained in the October 19 raids. The number subsequently rose to 24, according to DHA.

    Prosecutors are investigating allegations of establishing, leading or belonging to a criminal organization, money laundering, defrauding public institutions and violations of tax laws.

    The investigation has targeted community leader Alihan Kuriş, who has been jailed pending trial since August. Kuriş has denied leading a criminal organization or participating in money laundering or fraud.

    The case has expanded through successive operations targeting people and businesses linked to the community. In September, prosecutors issued warrants for 29 suspects and secured the appointment of court-supervised trustees to 23 companies.

    The Süleymanlılar trace their roots to Islamic scholar Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. The community runs Quran courses, student dormitories, charities and businesses in Turkey and Europe, particularly Germany. Kuriş, a grandson of Tunahan, became its leader in 2016.

    The investigation has prompted questions about possible political motives. The community has remained outside President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) close circle of religious allies and has at times reportedly supported opposition parties.

    Former education minister Hüseyin Çelik, a founding AKP member, warned in August that investigations into religious communities risked becoming a way to punish groups whose leaders opposed the government.

    He questioned whether the Süleymanlılar would have faced similar action had their leadership supported the ruling party.

    The government denies targeting the community over its beliefs or political position. Justice Minister Akın Gürlek has claimed that the investigation concerns alleged financial crimes rather than religious activities.

  • Azerbaijan seeks to contain Azerbaijan dispute ahead of regional summit

    Azerbaijan seeks to contain Azerbaijan dispute ahead of regional summit

    Turkey is seeking to contain a growing dispute with Azerbaijan over criticism of school headscarf restrictions, as reports of demands from Baku and uncertainty over President Ilham Aliyev’s attendance at an upcoming regional summit put the relationship under pressure.

    Azerbaijan’s decision to bar 31 Turkish nationals from entering the country on Wednesday expanded the dispute beyond the seven Turkish citizens facing arrest in absentia over alleged calls to overthrow the Azerbaijani government. The entry ban list includes opposition politicians, media figures and religious writers, with Azerbaijani officials accusing those named of making statements that threaten the country’s sovereignty and national security.

    The dispute began after Azerbaijan amended its school uniform rules on September 21 to prohibit clothing considered incompatible with prescribed uniforms or secular education. Although the rules do not explicitly mention headscarves, reports that girls wearing them were turned away from classrooms prompted protests and criticism from Turkish politicians.

    On October 12 Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, called the restrictions unacceptable and urged Azerbaijan to reverse them. Members of Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) also criticized the policy. The following day, Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) accused Saral and AKP lawmakers of making “populist and irresponsible” statements and interfering in the country’s domestic affairs.

    A Middle East Eye report published October 19, citing three officials and a source familiar with the matter, said Baku had asked Ankara to dismiss Saral, prosecute social media commentators who had insulted Aliyev and block accounts identified by Azerbaijani officials. Turkey blocked some of the accounts but had taken no further action.

    Azerbaijani media outlets close to the government subsequently accused Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan of encouraging unrest against Aliyev following Fidan’s visit to Baku. The Turkish Embassy rejected the allegations, denying that Fidan had held secret meetings or issued instructions to interfere in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs. Azerbaijani news outlet Qafqazinfo removed passages targeting Fidan after the embassy’s denial. Azerbaijan’s Press Council also criticized some Turkish media coverage, accusing outlets of exceeding the bounds of press freedom.

    Turkish political figures have sought to limit the fallout. Former prime minister Binali Yıldırım said Saral’s comments did not represent official Turkish policy, while Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli called for common sense.

    The dispute comes as Turkey and Azerbaijan prepare for the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Ankara, where Turkey is due to take over the group’s chairmanship from Azerbaijan. Foreign ministers are scheduled to meet on October 29, followed by the heads-of-state summit on October 30.

    Turkish Foreign Ministry sources told the Cumhuriyet newspaper that all leaders had been invited and that Aliyev’s attendance was expected. Middle East Eye’s sources, however, said his participation remained unconfirmed.

    Separately, Turkey’s Center for Combating Disinformation, part of the Presidential Communications Directorate, said on October 20 that social media claims that someone had attempted to remove the Turkish flag in Azerbaijan relied on old footage. The center said the flag had not been taken down and accused those circulating the footage as recent of seeking to damage relations between the two countries.

    Azerbaijan’s Interior Ministry has said 37 people were detained during protests against enforcement of the school uniform rules. The dispute has put pressure on a relationship built on close political, military and cultural ties, which the two governments often describe with the phrase “one nation, two states.”

  • [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    Adem Yavuz Arslan* 

    For Turkish citizens trying to understand whether their country could become embroiled in Yemen’s war, the most revealing recent statement came from Washington.

    Speaking to reporters before departing for Alaska on October 13, President Donald Trump suggested he might ask Turkey to help counter Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. He appeared confident about the answer: “President Erdogan, I think, would do as I ask.”

    There is no announced Turkish combat deployment to Yemen. Trump’s remark establishes neither that a request has been made nor that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has accepted one. But it raises a question with implications beyond the conflict: Why does an American president speak so confidently about his ability to secure another country’s military cooperation?

    Part of the answer may lie in Trump’s habitual exaggeration of his influence. Another part lies in the way Erdoğan governs. By concentrating authority at home and making personal access central to foreign policy, Turkey’s president has made himself the indispensable negotiating partner. He has also made his own vulnerabilities more consequential for the country.

    The Yemen crisis could test how much room that leaves him to refuse Washington.

    Turkey’s involvement already extends beyond diplomatic expressions of solidarity. Ankara had decided to provide Saudi Arabia with defensive and technical assistance, including drone operators, intelligence sharing and logistical support, according to an October 7 Reuters report citing Turkish and US officials.

    The broader framework is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August. Its publicly announced principle is sweeping: An armed attack on one signatory is to be treated as an attack on all three. That establishes a collective security commitment but does not, by itself, explain which military actions each government must undertake in a particular crisis.

    Parliament had yet to approve the agreement when Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed it on October 8. He ruled out Turkish participation in offensive operations while describing support for Saudi Arabia’s defense.

    On October 15 Turkey’s Defense Ministry said parliamentary approval of the agreement and the necessary authorization procedures for sending Turkish forces abroad had yet to be completed. Reuters reported that assistance provided before ratification was largely bilateral.

    Erdoğan has left greater flexibility. In responses to Newsweek published on September 25, he said the extent of assistance would depend on the threat and could include more advanced military support. He also cautioned against assuming that every incident would automatically trigger a military response.

    These statements leave substantial questions unanswered about the limits of Turkey’s commitment. They do not justify claiming that Ankara has already agreed to fight in Yemen. Nor does Trump’s confidence prove that Washington possesses a secret undertaking. It does, however, sharpen the need to explain how Turkish decisions will be made — and whose priorities will determine them.

    Saudi Arabia has compelling reasons to seek help. Houthi attacks have brought the war into the kingdom’s economic and political centers. A strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on October 10 killed at least 13 people and wounded more than 300.

    The threat reaches beyond the immediate casualties. Disrupted aviation, vulnerable energy infrastructure and uncertainty over the security of major cities undermine the conditions on which Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation depends.

    Military assistance would also carry substantial risks. The Houthis have demonstrated an ability to penetrate defenses supplied at enormous expense, exposing the difficulty of protecting a vast territory against adaptable missile and drone attacks.

    For Turkey, helping intercept an incoming missile and joining a campaign against launch sites inside Yemen would entail different objectives, legal questions and risks. Yet those missions can become connected. Personnel sent to operate defensive equipment may require protection. An attack on them may generate pressure for retaliation. Retaliation may create demands for further operations.

    Such escalation is a possibility, not an inevitability. Preventing it requires that clear limits be established before a deployment becomes politically difficult to reverse.

    Trump’s language offers little reassurance that he views those limits as central.

    On June 24, during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, he praised Erdoğan and Turkey’s military while saying he had asked the Turkish leader to stay out of the Iran war and that Erdoğan had complied.

    Whether that account accurately captures Ankara’s reasoning is a separate matter. Its significance lies in the relationship Trump presents to the public: He makes a request and Erdoğan delivers.

    Erdoğan benefits from this presentation in one respect. A friendly American president offers recognition and access. But the same arrangement allows Trump to portray Turkey’s policy choices as personal accommodations.

    That can weaken Erdoğan’s negotiating position. If cooperation is publicly treated as evidence of friendship, refusal becomes a test of the relationship. A disagreement over national interests acquires the character of a personal rebuff.

    Trump has previously shown that praise can coexist with coercion. In October 2019 he threatened to destroy Turkey’s economy and sent Erdoğan a letter containing the admonition, “Don’t be a fool!”

    The friendly language of the present cannot erase that history. Erdoğan is dealing with a president who has demonstrated a willingness to use economic pressure against Turkey and to advertise that pressure publicly.

    The resolution of the Halkbank prosecution adds another dimension.

    On June 17 US District Judge Richard Berman dismissed the criminal indictment against the Turkish state-owned lender after an agreement with the Trump administration. The decision ended a prosecution that had weighed on relations between the two countries for years.

    There is no public evidence connecting that outcome to a Turkish commitment over Yemen. Any claim of an exchange would exceed the available facts.

    Nevertheless, a favorable outcome in a politically important case can influence a relationship without a documented bargain. Trump may regard the resolution as an accomplishment for which Erdoğan owes him consideration. Whether Erdoğan shares that understanding is unknown.

    The distinction matters. An analysis of potential leverage should not become an allegation of a secret deal. But neither should the absence of evidence for a specific bargain end scrutiny of the incentives surrounding future decisions.

    Turkey’s exposure to financial pressure supplies another constraint. A confrontation with Washington can affect investor expectations and the perceived stability of the economy. For any Turkish government, those costs would require consideration. In a system centered on one leader, they may also intersect with concerns about political survival and international acceptance.

    Erdoğan is not without leverage. Turkey’s military capabilities and strategic position give Washington reasons to seek cooperation. His willingness to pursue policies opposed by Western allies also makes blanket descriptions of obedience unconvincing.

    The question is narrower: Can he use Turkey’s assets to negotiate clear limits, or does his reliance on a personal relationship make those limits harder to defend?

    Accountability is essential to answering it.

    Unresolved corruption allegations and politically sensitive financial cases become foreign policy concerns when the public cannot determine whether they influence decisions. Their existence does not prove that a leader is being coerced. The danger arises when independent institutions cannot credibly investigate potential conflicts between the leader’s interests and those of the state.

    Under those conditions even a defensible military decision can become difficult to assess. Citizens cannot know whether their government is responding to a genuine security threat, honoring a clearly defined obligation or protecting a relationship whose full terms remain beyond scrutiny.

    Religious solidarity could further complicate that assessment. A deployment presented as protecting Mecca and Medina would carry emotional force in Turkey. But the protection of holy sites cannot settle questions about command, geographic limits, escalation or withdrawal. Those require specific answers.

    The decisive issue, then, is not Erdoğan’s personal courage in confronting Trump. It is whether Turkey has a decision-making process capable of distinguishing the country’s interests from its president’s needs.

    Before any expanded military commitment, Ankara should explain the threat it intends to address, the limits of its mission and the conditions for ending it. Parliament and the public need enough information to judge those choices.

    Trump may believe Erdoğan will do as he asks. Turkey’s institutions should ensure that belief is never sufficient grounds for sending Turkish soldiers to war.

    *Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

    [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

     

    When allegations emerged that Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, a former minister and one of the most senior figures in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP,) and her husband had turned a combined investment of about 163 million Turkish lira ($3.3 million) into more than 2 billion lira (about $41 million) in proceeds from stock sales within months, Kaya resigned from her positions in the party.

    The figures were recently disclosed by opposition politician Zeynel Emre.

    Yet while Turkey and the world were watching what has been described as one of the country’s biggest financial scandals, Kaya had been part of Erdoğan’s delegation at the United Nations summit, appearing as though nothing unusual had happened.

    The Kaya couple, who are widely regarded as being close to the Erdoğan family and his political circle, reportedly invested about 163 million lira between them, much of it in Özata Denizcilik shares, beginning in April 2026.

    According to allegations made by New Party spokesperson Emre, Kaya invested about 63.4 million lira ($1.3 million) and later withdrew about 1.34 billion lira ($27.3 million), while her husband, İlyas Kaya, invested about 99.7 million lira ($2 million) and withdrew about 826 million lira ($16.9 million). Emre alleged that they sold their holdings before the financial crisis and market turmoil that erupted in mid-September.

    Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Turkish investors were caught in the collapse. The crisis has affected more than 450,000 investors across 131 funds, with more than $18 billion in assets held in funds now being liquidated.

    The Kaya couple have reportedly transferred approximately 2.2 billion lira ($44.9 million) to an account designated by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance.

    But returning the money does not, by itself, establish that they committed a crime or constitute a legal admission of wrongdoing. Their transactions, their source of information and the circumstances surrounding the trades still require independent investigation.

    Prosecutors have since moved to freeze the assets of Kaya and her husband as part of the fund investigation.

    That raises much bigger questions.

    Why did no one in Erdoğan’s government seriously ask how a senior ruling-party figure and her husband acquired the capital to make such a large investment, why they invested in this particular stock at precisely that time, and how they managed to exit after such a spectacular rise in its value?

    How can a stock rise so dramatically in only a few months without attracting extraordinary scrutiny? And when such extraordinary and potentially manipulative movements occur, why did the institutions responsible for monitoring the stock market and protecting investors fail to intervene earlier?

    These questions are particularly important because the institutions responsible for regulating and overseeing Turkey’s financial markets are headed by people appointed by the government and operating within Erdoğan’s political system.

    And there is an even bigger question.

    How was a crisis involving 131 funds with assets worth more than $18 billion allowed to develop in the first place? Who benefited from the extraordinary price movements now under investigation?

    There is also a striking contrast in the way Erdoğan’s government treats political opponents and figures close to the ruling establishment. Opposition figures, including İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have been arrested and imprisoned amid corruption allegations. In Kaya’s case, prosecutors have now moved to freeze her and her husband’s assets, but neither has been detained or charged over the alleged trades. Where is the same level of scrutiny?

    And why did Kaya remain silent when the allegations first emerged? Her resignation statement said she was stepping aside so the allegations could be investigated independently, but she did not directly address Emre’s detailed claims about the trades.

    If opposition politicians had not publicly disclosed her name and the details of the transactions, would she have voluntarily come forward to explain how she and her husband had allegedly made such extraordinary gains from these trades?

    But perhaps the most painful question is not financial. It is moral.

    Erdoğan, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya and many other figures in the ruling party regularly present themselves to the public through religious language, symbols and imagery.

    What happens to religion when politicians who invoke it so frequently become associated with privilege, extraordinary wealth and allegations of corruption?

    What happens when religious language becomes a political shield against demands for transparency and accountability?

    What does it do to faith when politicians who constantly invoke Islam and religious values are accused of benefiting from extraordinary financial transactions while ordinary citizens bear the losses?

    And do genuinely religious people recognize the damage that this kind of Islamist politics, using religion as a political shield, can inflict on religion itself?

    The AKP’s rise to power was fueled in large part by the sense of grievance created in the 1990s, when Turkey’s secular establishment imposed severe restrictions on women who wore the headscarf, particularly in universities and public institutions.

    Today, however, the AKP has taken the repression it once condemned to a level far beyond what those old regimes imposed on their opponents. And there is a particularly striking irony in the fact that one of the figures now at the center of corruption allegations is herself a woman who wears the headscarf.

    Sadly, this also seems to have vindicated the warnings that Islamist politicians may embrace democracy, justice and freedoms most enthusiastically when they are in opposition. Once they gain power, the temptation can be to treat those principles as instruments rather than universal values.

    Erdoğan himself has long been widely quoted as expressing such an instrumental view of democracy during his years as mayor of İstanbul: “Democracy is like a tram. You ride it until you reach your destination, then you get off.”

    *Abdülhamit Bilici is the former editor-in-chief of the now-defunct Zaman daily who currently lives in exile in Washington, D.C.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • 2 deputy mayors among 7 jailed in Ankara corruption probe

    2 deputy mayors among 7 jailed in Ankara corruption probe

    A Turkish court on Saturday jailed two deputy mayors and five other people pending trial in a corruption investigation into Ankara’s opposition-run municipality of Etimesgut.

    Deputy Mayors Gültekin Bayındır and Fikret Gözüoğlu were among those jailed, while four other suspects were put under house arrest.

    The court decisions followed the detention of 25 people, five of them municipal employees, in raids across five provinces on October 13.

    Etimesgut, in western Ankara, is governed by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

    The investigation concerns allegations of forged documents and irregularities in municipal contracts, along with improper benefits connected to parking lot leases, zoning decisions and construction permits, according to the Ankara West Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.

    The offenses under investigation range from bribery, embezzlement and extortion by public officials to forming a criminal organization, rigging tenders and misconduct in carrying out public contracts.

    Nine detainees gave statements under provisions offering leniency for cooperation with investigators, while prosecutors requested judicial supervision for five others, according to a prosecution statement carried by state media.

    The court jailed seven of the 11 suspects whose pretrial detention prosecutors had requested, ordering house arrest for the other four.

    The case had already led to the jailing of Etimesgut Mayor Erdal Beşikçioğlu and 39 others pending trial on August 3, following the detention of 55 people on July 30.

    The Interior Ministry suspended Beşikçioğlu from office the day he was jailed.

    Beşikçioğlu, an actor who plays a homicide detective in the television series “Behzat Ç.,” was elected mayor in 2024.

    He has denied wrongdoing, arguing that some of the irregularities cited in audit reports were uncovered through an internal review he ordered.

    He also denied personal or commercial ties to the companies under investigation and maintained that the municipal tenders in question were outside his direct authority.

    CHP candidate Seda Dilber was elected acting mayor by the city council on August 10, with the support of members from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling party, defeating the New Party’s Mehmet Özdemir.

    The New Party was formed in July by former CHP leader Özgür Özel and lawmakers who left the party after a court removed him as chairman.

    The Etimesgut investigation is part of a series of cases targeting opposition-run municipalities following the CHP’s victory over Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the March 2024 local elections.

    Opposition politicians accuse the government of using the investigations to weaken Erdoğan’s rivals and reverse their electoral gains.