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  • Erdoğan says Turkey shut or took over Gülen-linked schools in over 50 countries, vows to press on

    Erdoğan says Turkey shut or took over Gülen-linked schools in over 50 countries, vows to press on

    Turkey has secured the closure or takeover of schools linked to the faith-based Gülen movement in more than 50 countries, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Thursday, vowing to continue his government’s campaign against the group abroad.

    Speaking at an event in Ankara marking the 10th anniversary of the state-run Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV), Erdoğan praised the foundation’s takeover of schools previously associated with the movement and credited the Foreign Ministry, the foundation and other government institutions with carrying out the campaign abroad. He said the campaign had intensified after a July 2016 coup attempt.

    Erdoğan also described the Gülen movement as a “network of treachery” and its schools “dens of sedition,” saying its supporters would become “much more pitiable, much more wretched.” The remarks reflect a longstanding pattern of hate speech, with Erdoğan and other government officials portraying the movement’s followers as internal enemies and using dehumanizing language to legitimize their persecution, while pro-government media have amplified the rhetoric.

    Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdoğan as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after the coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the attempted coup or any terrorist activity.

    Erdoğan did not identify the countries involved, specify how many schools were affected or say where closures had been complete or partial.

    A July 2026 report by the human rights group Solidarity with Others documented the closure, confiscation or transfer of at least 162 Gülen-linked educational institutions in 29 countries, based on data compiled through March 2023. Of those, 131 were taken over directly by the Turkish Maarif Foundation. The report estimated that approximately 7,800 employees were affected.

    Since the July 2016 coup attempt, Ankara has pressed foreign governments to close or transfer Gülen-linked schools to the TMV, part of a broader campaign against perceived opponents abroad that human rights organizations have described as transnational repression.

    The foundation is the only organization other than Turkey’s Education Ministry authorized to open schools overseas on behalf of the Turkish state.

    The campaign has also extended beyond school closures and takeovers to the educators themselves. SCF has documented cases of educators associated with the Gülen movement being abducted or forcibly returned to Turkey from countries including Kosovo, Pakistan, Malaysia and Myanmar. Many Turkish teachers at schools targeted for takeover fled their host countries, fearing arrest or extradition, and sought refuge in Europe, the United States or Canada.

    The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) cited Freedom House data listing Turkey among the world’s 10 leading perpetrators of physical transnational repression in a June resolution. The rights group documented 160 such incidents attributed to Turkey from 2014 through 2025.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    Adem Yavuz Arslan* 

    For Turkish citizens trying to understand whether their country could become embroiled in Yemen’s war, the most revealing recent statement came from Washington.

    Speaking to reporters before departing for Alaska on October 13, President Donald Trump suggested he might ask Turkey to help counter Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. He appeared confident about the answer: “President Erdogan, I think, would do as I ask.”

    There is no announced Turkish combat deployment to Yemen. Trump’s remark establishes neither that a request has been made nor that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has accepted one. But it raises a question with implications beyond the conflict: Why does an American president speak so confidently about his ability to secure another country’s military cooperation?

    Part of the answer may lie in Trump’s habitual exaggeration of his influence. Another part lies in the way Erdoğan governs. By concentrating authority at home and making personal access central to foreign policy, Turkey’s president has made himself the indispensable negotiating partner. He has also made his own vulnerabilities more consequential for the country.

    The Yemen crisis could test how much room that leaves him to refuse Washington.

    Turkey’s involvement already extends beyond diplomatic expressions of solidarity. Ankara had decided to provide Saudi Arabia with defensive and technical assistance, including drone operators, intelligence sharing and logistical support, according to an October 7 Reuters report citing Turkish and US officials.

    The broader framework is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August. Its publicly announced principle is sweeping: An armed attack on one signatory is to be treated as an attack on all three. That establishes a collective security commitment but does not, by itself, explain which military actions each government must undertake in a particular crisis.

    Parliament had yet to approve the agreement when Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed it on October 8. He ruled out Turkish participation in offensive operations while describing support for Saudi Arabia’s defense.

    On October 15 Turkey’s Defense Ministry said parliamentary approval of the agreement and the necessary authorization procedures for sending Turkish forces abroad had yet to be completed. Reuters reported that assistance provided before ratification was largely bilateral.

    Erdoğan has left greater flexibility. In responses to Newsweek published on September 25, he said the extent of assistance would depend on the threat and could include more advanced military support. He also cautioned against assuming that every incident would automatically trigger a military response.

    These statements leave substantial questions unanswered about the limits of Turkey’s commitment. They do not justify claiming that Ankara has already agreed to fight in Yemen. Nor does Trump’s confidence prove that Washington possesses a secret undertaking. It does, however, sharpen the need to explain how Turkish decisions will be made — and whose priorities will determine them.

    Saudi Arabia has compelling reasons to seek help. Houthi attacks have brought the war into the kingdom’s economic and political centers. A strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on October 10 killed at least 13 people and wounded more than 300.

    The threat reaches beyond the immediate casualties. Disrupted aviation, vulnerable energy infrastructure and uncertainty over the security of major cities undermine the conditions on which Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation depends.

    Military assistance would also carry substantial risks. The Houthis have demonstrated an ability to penetrate defenses supplied at enormous expense, exposing the difficulty of protecting a vast territory against adaptable missile and drone attacks.

    For Turkey, helping intercept an incoming missile and joining a campaign against launch sites inside Yemen would entail different objectives, legal questions and risks. Yet those missions can become connected. Personnel sent to operate defensive equipment may require protection. An attack on them may generate pressure for retaliation. Retaliation may create demands for further operations.

    Such escalation is a possibility, not an inevitability. Preventing it requires that clear limits be established before a deployment becomes politically difficult to reverse.

    Trump’s language offers little reassurance that he views those limits as central.

    On June 24, during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, he praised Erdoğan and Turkey’s military while saying he had asked the Turkish leader to stay out of the Iran war and that Erdoğan had complied.

    Whether that account accurately captures Ankara’s reasoning is a separate matter. Its significance lies in the relationship Trump presents to the public: He makes a request and Erdoğan delivers.

    Erdoğan benefits from this presentation in one respect. A friendly American president offers recognition and access. But the same arrangement allows Trump to portray Turkey’s policy choices as personal accommodations.

    That can weaken Erdoğan’s negotiating position. If cooperation is publicly treated as evidence of friendship, refusal becomes a test of the relationship. A disagreement over national interests acquires the character of a personal rebuff.

    Trump has previously shown that praise can coexist with coercion. In October 2019 he threatened to destroy Turkey’s economy and sent Erdoğan a letter containing the admonition, “Don’t be a fool!”

    The friendly language of the present cannot erase that history. Erdoğan is dealing with a president who has demonstrated a willingness to use economic pressure against Turkey and to advertise that pressure publicly.

    The resolution of the Halkbank prosecution adds another dimension.

    On June 17 US District Judge Richard Berman dismissed the criminal indictment against the Turkish state-owned lender after an agreement with the Trump administration. The decision ended a prosecution that had weighed on relations between the two countries for years.

    There is no public evidence connecting that outcome to a Turkish commitment over Yemen. Any claim of an exchange would exceed the available facts.

    Nevertheless, a favorable outcome in a politically important case can influence a relationship without a documented bargain. Trump may regard the resolution as an accomplishment for which Erdoğan owes him consideration. Whether Erdoğan shares that understanding is unknown.

    The distinction matters. An analysis of potential leverage should not become an allegation of a secret deal. But neither should the absence of evidence for a specific bargain end scrutiny of the incentives surrounding future decisions.

    Turkey’s exposure to financial pressure supplies another constraint. A confrontation with Washington can affect investor expectations and the perceived stability of the economy. For any Turkish government, those costs would require consideration. In a system centered on one leader, they may also intersect with concerns about political survival and international acceptance.

    Erdoğan is not without leverage. Turkey’s military capabilities and strategic position give Washington reasons to seek cooperation. His willingness to pursue policies opposed by Western allies also makes blanket descriptions of obedience unconvincing.

    The question is narrower: Can he use Turkey’s assets to negotiate clear limits, or does his reliance on a personal relationship make those limits harder to defend?

    Accountability is essential to answering it.

    Unresolved corruption allegations and politically sensitive financial cases become foreign policy concerns when the public cannot determine whether they influence decisions. Their existence does not prove that a leader is being coerced. The danger arises when independent institutions cannot credibly investigate potential conflicts between the leader’s interests and those of the state.

    Under those conditions even a defensible military decision can become difficult to assess. Citizens cannot know whether their government is responding to a genuine security threat, honoring a clearly defined obligation or protecting a relationship whose full terms remain beyond scrutiny.

    Religious solidarity could further complicate that assessment. A deployment presented as protecting Mecca and Medina would carry emotional force in Turkey. But the protection of holy sites cannot settle questions about command, geographic limits, escalation or withdrawal. Those require specific answers.

    The decisive issue, then, is not Erdoğan’s personal courage in confronting Trump. It is whether Turkey has a decision-making process capable of distinguishing the country’s interests from its president’s needs.

    Before any expanded military commitment, Ankara should explain the threat it intends to address, the limits of its mission and the conditions for ending it. Parliament and the public need enough information to judge those choices.

    Trump may believe Erdoğan will do as he asks. Turkey’s institutions should ensure that belief is never sufficient grounds for sending Turkish soldiers to war.

    *Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

    [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

     

    When allegations emerged that Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, a former minister and one of the most senior figures in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP,) and her husband had turned a combined investment of about 163 million Turkish lira ($3.3 million) into more than 2 billion lira (about $41 million) in proceeds from stock sales within months, Kaya resigned from her positions in the party.

    The figures were recently disclosed by opposition politician Zeynel Emre.

    Yet while Turkey and the world were watching what has been described as one of the country’s biggest financial scandals, Kaya had been part of Erdoğan’s delegation at the United Nations summit, appearing as though nothing unusual had happened.

    The Kaya couple, who are widely regarded as being close to the Erdoğan family and his political circle, reportedly invested about 163 million lira between them, much of it in Özata Denizcilik shares, beginning in April 2026.

    According to allegations made by New Party spokesperson Emre, Kaya invested about 63.4 million lira ($1.3 million) and later withdrew about 1.34 billion lira ($27.3 million), while her husband, İlyas Kaya, invested about 99.7 million lira ($2 million) and withdrew about 826 million lira ($16.9 million). Emre alleged that they sold their holdings before the financial crisis and market turmoil that erupted in mid-September.

    Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Turkish investors were caught in the collapse. The crisis has affected more than 450,000 investors across 131 funds, with more than $18 billion in assets held in funds now being liquidated.

    The Kaya couple have reportedly transferred approximately 2.2 billion lira ($44.9 million) to an account designated by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance.

    But returning the money does not, by itself, establish that they committed a crime or constitute a legal admission of wrongdoing. Their transactions, their source of information and the circumstances surrounding the trades still require independent investigation.

    Prosecutors have since moved to freeze the assets of Kaya and her husband as part of the fund investigation.

    That raises much bigger questions.

    Why did no one in Erdoğan’s government seriously ask how a senior ruling-party figure and her husband acquired the capital to make such a large investment, why they invested in this particular stock at precisely that time, and how they managed to exit after such a spectacular rise in its value?

    How can a stock rise so dramatically in only a few months without attracting extraordinary scrutiny? And when such extraordinary and potentially manipulative movements occur, why did the institutions responsible for monitoring the stock market and protecting investors fail to intervene earlier?

    These questions are particularly important because the institutions responsible for regulating and overseeing Turkey’s financial markets are headed by people appointed by the government and operating within Erdoğan’s political system.

    And there is an even bigger question.

    How was a crisis involving 131 funds with assets worth more than $18 billion allowed to develop in the first place? Who benefited from the extraordinary price movements now under investigation?

    There is also a striking contrast in the way Erdoğan’s government treats political opponents and figures close to the ruling establishment. Opposition figures, including İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have been arrested and imprisoned amid corruption allegations. In Kaya’s case, prosecutors have now moved to freeze her and her husband’s assets, but neither has been detained or charged over the alleged trades. Where is the same level of scrutiny?

    And why did Kaya remain silent when the allegations first emerged? Her resignation statement said she was stepping aside so the allegations could be investigated independently, but she did not directly address Emre’s detailed claims about the trades.

    If opposition politicians had not publicly disclosed her name and the details of the transactions, would she have voluntarily come forward to explain how she and her husband had allegedly made such extraordinary gains from these trades?

    But perhaps the most painful question is not financial. It is moral.

    Erdoğan, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya and many other figures in the ruling party regularly present themselves to the public through religious language, symbols and imagery.

    What happens to religion when politicians who invoke it so frequently become associated with privilege, extraordinary wealth and allegations of corruption?

    What happens when religious language becomes a political shield against demands for transparency and accountability?

    What does it do to faith when politicians who constantly invoke Islam and religious values are accused of benefiting from extraordinary financial transactions while ordinary citizens bear the losses?

    And do genuinely religious people recognize the damage that this kind of Islamist politics, using religion as a political shield, can inflict on religion itself?

    The AKP’s rise to power was fueled in large part by the sense of grievance created in the 1990s, when Turkey’s secular establishment imposed severe restrictions on women who wore the headscarf, particularly in universities and public institutions.

    Today, however, the AKP has taken the repression it once condemned to a level far beyond what those old regimes imposed on their opponents. And there is a particularly striking irony in the fact that one of the figures now at the center of corruption allegations is herself a woman who wears the headscarf.

    Sadly, this also seems to have vindicated the warnings that Islamist politicians may embrace democracy, justice and freedoms most enthusiastically when they are in opposition. Once they gain power, the temptation can be to treat those principles as instruments rather than universal values.

    Erdoğan himself has long been widely quoted as expressing such an instrumental view of democracy during his years as mayor of İstanbul: “Democracy is like a tram. You ride it until you reach your destination, then you get off.”

    *Abdülhamit Bilici is the former editor-in-chief of the now-defunct Zaman daily who currently lives in exile in Washington, D.C.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • 2 deputy mayors among 7 jailed in Ankara corruption probe

    2 deputy mayors among 7 jailed in Ankara corruption probe

    A Turkish court on Saturday jailed two deputy mayors and five other people pending trial in a corruption investigation into Ankara’s opposition-run municipality of Etimesgut.

    Deputy Mayors Gültekin Bayındır and Fikret Gözüoğlu were among those jailed, while four other suspects were put under house arrest.

    The court decisions followed the detention of 25 people, five of them municipal employees, in raids across five provinces on October 13.

    Etimesgut, in western Ankara, is governed by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

    The investigation concerns allegations of forged documents and irregularities in municipal contracts, along with improper benefits connected to parking lot leases, zoning decisions and construction permits, according to the Ankara West Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.

    The offenses under investigation range from bribery, embezzlement and extortion by public officials to forming a criminal organization, rigging tenders and misconduct in carrying out public contracts.

    Nine detainees gave statements under provisions offering leniency for cooperation with investigators, while prosecutors requested judicial supervision for five others, according to a prosecution statement carried by state media.

    The court jailed seven of the 11 suspects whose pretrial detention prosecutors had requested, ordering house arrest for the other four.

    The case had already led to the jailing of Etimesgut Mayor Erdal Beşikçioğlu and 39 others pending trial on August 3, following the detention of 55 people on July 30.

    The Interior Ministry suspended Beşikçioğlu from office the day he was jailed.

    Beşikçioğlu, an actor who plays a homicide detective in the television series “Behzat Ç.,” was elected mayor in 2024.

    He has denied wrongdoing, arguing that some of the irregularities cited in audit reports were uncovered through an internal review he ordered.

    He also denied personal or commercial ties to the companies under investigation and maintained that the municipal tenders in question were outside his direct authority.

    CHP candidate Seda Dilber was elected acting mayor by the city council on August 10, with the support of members from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling party, defeating the New Party’s Mehmet Özdemir.

    The New Party was formed in July by former CHP leader Özgür Özel and lawmakers who left the party after a court removed him as chairman.

    The Etimesgut investigation is part of a series of cases targeting opposition-run municipalities following the CHP’s victory over Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the March 2024 local elections.

    Opposition politicians accuse the government of using the investigations to weaken Erdoğan’s rivals and reverse their electoral gains.

  • Jailed İstanbul mayor accuses Erdoğan gov’t of shielding corruption in trial defense

    Jailed İstanbul mayor accuses Erdoğan gov’t of shielding corruption in trial defense

    Jailed İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political rival, on Wednesday accused Turkey’s government of using prosecutions and pressure on the media to shield corruption as he began his defense in a trial he says is intended to block his presidential bid.

    İmamoğlu began presenting his defense nearly 19 months after he was jailed pending trial, appearing before a court at the Marmara Prison complex in Silivri, west of İstanbul, where he has been imprisoned since March 23, 2025.

    The case concerns allegations of bribery, bid rigging, money laundering and an organized crime network at the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality, with 436 defendants, 53 of them in pretrial detention.

    İmamoğlu denies the accusations and faces more than 2,400 years in prison if convicted on all counts, with prosecutors alleging that he used municipal resources to enrich himself and finance his political ambitions.

    In the opening of his defense, he accused those behind his prosecution of protecting people involved in Turkey’s investment fund scandal while portraying him as the leader of a criminal organization, according to a transcript published by the Medyascope news website.

    “They looked in the mirror and wrote what they saw into the indictment against me,” he said.

    İmamoğlu focused on Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, who was İstanbul’s chief public prosecutor when the investigations into the mayor began, accusing him of pursuing opposition politicians while failing to act with the same urgency over suspected financial wrongdoing.

    He told the court that Gürlek’s office sent a request to the Capital Markets Board (SPK), Turkey’s securities regulator, concerning investment funds on February 26, 2025, but failed to follow it with further investigative demands or police operations, the Bianet news website reported.

    He contrasted that response with letters prosecutors sent to İstanbul University on February 24 and March 11, 2025, which he described as pressure to revoke his diploma before police detained him on March 19.

    The university revoked his degree on March 18, 2025, citing alleged irregularities in his university transfer decades earlier, a decision that threatens his presidential candidacy because Turkey requires candidates to have a university degree.

    The fund crisis erupted in September after some funds could not meet withdrawal requests amid suspected share-price manipulation, prompting the regulator to order the liquidation of 131 funds managed by seven companies with 455,758 individual investors.

    İmamoğlu accused officials of failing to secure evidence and allowing companies implicated in the scandal to continue operating, arguing that political connections explained the difference between their treatment and the dawn raids against municipal officials.

    He also condemned Wednesday’s takeover of Halk TV, a broadcaster that covers the opposition, linking the intervention to efforts to prevent the public from hearing about the fund scandal and his defense.

    Police raided the station’s İstanbul headquarters and halted live broadcasts as the state-run Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) took control under an investigation into owner Cafer Mahiroğlu over alleged bribery, bid rigging and money laundering.

    İmamoğlu urged people to support Halk TV and journalists, arguing that viewers should decide whether a broadcaster survives and that the government was using the judiciary to compensate for its losses at the ballot box.

    He cited the imprisonment of journalists Mustafa Balcı and Şaban Sevinç and the house arrest of İsmail Saymaz and Murat Ağırel, whose cases concern coverage of alleged links between government figures and the fund scandal.

    Turning to his own trial, İmamoğlu argued that pretrial detention had become a means of punishment and accused officials of transferring defendants to distant prisons and pressuring them after they refused demands he described as unlawful.

    He also challenged the ban on his book, “Millet Şahidimdir” (The Nation Is My Witness), which contains the defense he prepared after a dispute over speaking time prevented him from presenting it in July.

    Police initially justified their intervention at the printing house by alleging that the book lacked required publication labels but switched to examining its contents after the labels were found, he told the court.

    Beyond the allegations against him, İmamoğlu argued that Turkey’s institutions had lost their ability to restrain executive power and that prosecutions against elected politicians threatened the public’s right to replace the government through elections.

    “The real test of popular sovereignty is not how a government is elected, but whether the people can change it,” he said.

    İmamoğlu is the presidential candidate of the opposition New Party, whose leader, Özgür Özel, attended Wednesday’s hearing.

    Özel founded the party in July after he and 90 other lawmakers left the Republican People’s Party (CHP), following a court ruling that removed him as CHP leader and reinstated his predecessor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

    İmamoğlu won İstanbul’s mayoral election in 2019, ending decades of rule by Erdoğan’s political camp in Turkey’s largest city, and won again in a rerun after the first result was annulled before securing re-election in 2024.

    İmamoğlu and his lawyers have been allotted four days, through October 17, to present their defense in the trial, which began on March 9.

  • Turkey detains 32 people over alleged links to Gülen movement

    Turkey detains 32 people over alleged links to Gülen movement

    Turkish authorities have detained 32 people in operations across several provinces over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek said Wednesday.

    The operations were part of three investigations launched by prosecutors in Eskişehir and İzmir provinces that targeted 34 people. It was not immediately clear whether any of the detainees had been released or brought before a court.

    In Eskişehir, authorities detained nine of the 10 people included in an investigation into payments made through a US-based company allegedly linked to the Gülen movement. Prosecutors launched the investigation on suspicion that the payments, which were related to food products exported from Turkey, were connected to the movement.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdoğan as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after a coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the coup attempt or any terrorist activity.

    In a separate investigation conducted by the İzmir Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, authorities detained 21 people across four provinces over allegations that they were involved in the Gülen movement’s ongoing activities.

    Prosecutors said the detainees’ names appeared in digital materials seized from people allegedly linked to the movement. Police also seized digital materials and documents during the raids.

    In a third investigation also led by prosecutors in İzmir, authorities detained two people in İzmir and Aydın over allegations of membership in a terrorist organization. A third person included in the investigation was reported to be abroad.

    Prosecutors cited ByLock messages, records from the now-closed Bank Asya and phone records as evidence of alleged links to the movement. ByLock is an encrypted messaging app once widely available on Apple’s App Store and Google Play that Turkish authorities claim was used as a secret communication tool by Gülen supporters.

    In a landmark 2023 ruling in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that convictions based on ByLock use and other alleged Gülen-linked activities, such as having an account at a movement-affiliated bank, violated the rights to a fair trial, no punishment without law and freedom of association.

    Gürlek said the government would continue operations against the Gülen movement and would not tolerate any of its activities.

    According to the latest figures from the justice ministry, more than 127,000 people have been convicted of alleged links to the movement since 2016, with 10,485 still in prison and legal proceedings ongoing against 83,404 individuals.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • Flooding brings İstanbul to a standstill as death toll rises to 2

    Flooding brings İstanbul to a standstill as death toll rises to 2

    The death toll from severe flooding in İstanbul rose to two on Thursday as emergency crews continued rescue operations, flights were disrupted and school closures were extended through Friday.

     

    Torrential rain submerged roads, swept away cars and flooded homes and businesses across Turkey’s largest city, home to around 16 million people. Governor Davut Gül said crews had rescued more than 2,700 people.

    A 34-year-old man died after slipping while trying to cross a flooded street in the northern district of Sarıyer. He struck his head on a curb and was unable to get out of the water. Bystanders pulled him out, but he later died in a hospital, the state-run Anadolu news agency reported.

    His death followed the electrocution of a 14-year-old boy Wednesday evening at a park in Balat, a historic neighborhood on the city’s European side. The boy stepped into a pool of water and was taken to a hospital unconscious but could not be saved, the governor’s office said. Investigations were opened into both deaths.

    Emergency teams worked through the night to evacuate people from flooded buildings. Rescue operations were continuing at 14 locations Thursday, while three people remained hospitalized with injuries that were not life-threatening, Gül said.

    Residents unable to return home were being accommodated in hotels and public facilities.

    Rainfall reached 273.1 millimeters — about 10.8 inches — in Beykoz on the Asian side, according to updated municipal figures. That is equivalent to roughly 273 liters of water falling on every square meter of ground. Sarıyer and Eyüpsultan recorded more than 200 millimeters each.

    At İstanbul Airport, 51 incoming flights were diverted and 19 arrivals and departures were canceled, Gül said.

    Schools will remain closed Friday while teams inspect buildings for electrical faults and other hazards.

    Gül urged residents to avoid unnecessary travel, warning that rain was expected to continue for another two to three days and that the ground was already saturated.

    Turkey is highly vulnerable to climate hazards because of its geography, population exposure and reliance on sectors such as agriculture, the World Bank says.

    Global warming intensifies heavy rainfall, while urban expansion and paved surfaces increase runoff and strain drainage systems, according to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

    The flooding comes less than a month before Turkey hosts the COP31 UN climate conference in the Mediterranean city of Antalya from November 9 to 20.https://x.com/AustraliaZaman/status/2110587851167633585

  • Turkish gov’t takes control of leading pro-opposition news channel as pressure on media grows

    Turkish gov’t takes control of leading pro-opposition news channel as pressure on media grows

    The Turkish government took control of popular pro-opposition news channel Halk TV through state-appointed trustees early Wednesday, halting its live broadcasts as police raided its İstanbul headquarters, the channel reported.

    The İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office said the operation was part of an investigation into Halk TV owner Cafer Mahiroğlu over allegations of bribery, bid rigging and money laundering. Prosecutors ordered the detention of 17 suspects, 11 of whom were taken into custody, the DHA news agency reported.

    Mahiroğlu condemned the raid on Wednesday, saying seven members of his family were among those detained.

    “Today is a dark day for Turkey. The public’s right to information is being seized for political reasons,” he said in a video posted on X.

     

    The state-run Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) was appointed as trustee to Halk TV and companies linked to Mahiroğlu.Police blocked the road outside the channel’s headquarters and prevented employees from entering while officers searched the building. Halk TV reporter Gamze Altunay said hundreds of officers were involved.

     

    Halk TV said Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş asked the incoming trustee to allow live programming to continue, but his request was rejected. Toktaş also refused a proposal to work with the new management, describing the takeover as unlawful. MediaRadar news website subsequently reported that prerecorded footage of a Halk TV program remained on air.

    Prosecutors allege that 14.46 million lira (about $293,000) in unrecorded bribes had been paid in connection with İzmir Metropolitan Municipality tenders and that proceeds were transferred to companies owned by or linked to Mahiroğlu. They cited financial intelligence reports and witness statements in support of the allegations.

    Prosecutors also said Mahiroğlu was already wanted on suspicion of bid rigging in a separate investigation into İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality and had left Turkey on March 10, 2025.

    İzmir, Turkey’s third-largest city and a longtime opposition stronghold, had been governed by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) for more than two decades. Mayor Cemil Tugay, elected on the CHP ticket in 2024, joined President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on October 7 after leaving the CHP in June.

    Mahiroğlu announced the raid on social media, directing criticism at CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his allies. His initial post did not address the financial allegations.

    Days before the takeover, Halk TV came under attack from Kılıçdaroğlu, who was restored in May as leader of the CHP by a court ruling overturning the party congress at which he lost the leadership in 2023.

    Speaking on KRT television on October 9, Kılıçdaroğlu accused Halk TV of broadcasting false news “24 hours a day” and questioned why its owner, Mahiroğlu, remained abroad.

    He also said his colleagues had complained to broadcasting regulator RTÜK, which responded that the matter fell outside its remit.

    Mahiroğlu rejected the criticism, accusing Kılıçdaroğlu of targeting independent media and elected opposition politicians.

    Özgür Özel, leader of the opposition New Party, condemned the raid and trustee appointment, saying such an operation against a television station was something only dictators would do.

    The takeover coincided with jailed İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu beginning his defense in a corruption trial involving alleged bribery, bid rigging and money laundering at the municipality.

    Özel questioned the timing, pointing to both the trial and public demands for accountability over an investment fund scandal involving alleged market manipulation and political connections that has left investors unable to recover their savings.

    Özel and 90 other lawmakers left the CHP in July to establish the New Party after Kılıçdaroğlu was restored as party leader.

    The takeover of Halk TV comes amid mounting pressure on independent media in Turkey, following the recent blocking of news website T24 and sweeping restrictions on the X accounts of journalists, news organizations and rights groups.

    On September 30 an İstanbul court’s order blocked access to T24’s website and social media accounts over coverage prosecutors described as “LGBT propaganda.” Prosecutors cited 118 items published over the previous year. T24 said the decision followed a campaign of online defamation against the outlet.

    The Freedom of Expression Association (İFÖD) said at least 1,270 X accounts were subject to blocking orders in September, with the platform subsequently withholding about 90 percent of them in Turkey.

    Those affected included journalists, news organizations, academics, economists and rights groups. İFÖD’s own account and its EngelliWeb censorship-monitoring project were also targeted by blocking orders in October.

    Halk TV has also faced criminal investigations and broadcasting penalties. Toktaş was jailed in January 2025 over the broadcast of a telephone conversation with a court-appointed expert witness.

    A court ordered his release in March after 34 days in pretrial detention and acquitted him and four colleagues of attempting to influence judicial officials.

    A separate charge concerning the recording and publication of the conversation was referred for mediation.

    Halk TV, one of Turkey’s leading news channels, began broadcasting on January 10, 2005. It attracted a wide audience with its live coverage of the 2013 anti-government Gezi Park protests, which began over plans to redevelop an İstanbul park and grew into nationwide antigovernment demonstrations.

    Mahiroğlu bought the channel in 2020.

    Turkey’s media crackdown intensified after a failed coup in July 2016, when the government used emergency decrees to shut down newspapers, television channels, radio stations and publishers. By the end of 2017, some 166 media outlets and publishing houses had been closed and their assets confiscated without compensation, the UN human rights office reported.

    Turkey ranked 163rd among 180 countries and territories in Reporters Without Borders’ 2026 World Press Freedom Index, down from 159th in 2025. The group estimates that 90 percent of national media outlets are under government control.

  • Australia joins statement issued by several nations condemning Trump attack on ICC

    Australia joins statement issued by several nations condemning Trump attack on ICC

    The federal government has belatedly joined international criticism of the Trump administration’s latest assault on the International Criminal Court (ICC), prompting questions about Australia’s “sluggish” response to sweeping US sanctions designed to cripple it.

    Japan, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom issued a statement late on Friday reaffirming their “continued and unwavering support for the independence, impartiality, and integrity of the ICC”.

    It came just hours after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio unveiled new sanctions freezing the court’s US assets and cutting it off from American companies.

    “As committed supporters of the ICC we regret and strongly disagree with the announcement of sanctions to be imposed upon the Court by the United States,” they said.

    “If put into effect, these sanctions will have a significant impact on the Court’s work, its dedicated staff and their families. They work every day to bring those accused of the most serious international crimes to justice and to support their victims.”

    Australia was not listed on the statement when it was first issued on Saturday morning, local time, and the government’s initial silence drew fierce criticism from legal experts, who accused it of cowardice.

    But late on Monday Australia’s name was added to the list of countries on the joint statement, which was then uploaded to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) website.

    A federal government spokesperson told the ABC that Australia was invited to join the statement only after it was first published, and that Australia signalled to the Netherlands on Sunday that it would be willing to put its name on it.

    An official from a European country backed that account and defended Australia’s approach, saying it took time to coordinate a position across continents over the weekend.

    A second official from another Western country also said they did not believe that Australia had “hesitated” to join the statement and the process simply “took time”.

    But they said the Australian government was still taking a much more “careful” and “low profile” approach to defending the ICC when compared with other US allies.

    They drew a contrast between Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi  who on Friday night issued a statement in English and Japanese sharply criticising the sanctions  and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong, who have not made any personal statements on the issue.

    Canberra’s cautious approach

    Last month the foreign minister declined to directly criticise the Trump administration over the sanctions during an interview with SBS, saying that she “spoke for Australia” not the US.

    Woman standing and looking

    Professor Catherine Renshaw said it was disappointing Australia did not sign onto the original statement. (ABC News: Lydia Feng)

    Officials told the ABC earlier this year that while there was deep unease in Canberra about the sanctions, Australia was wary of a fight with the Trump administration over it, particularly as the campaign against the court has been championed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

    The Dean of Law at the University of Western Sydney, Professor Catherine Renshaw, said the government’s initial response was “sluggish” but that she was still pleased to see Australia eventually join the statement.

    “It was disappointing to see Australia not sign onto the original statement  it was particularly disappointing given Australia’s long history of building international law and support of institutions like the ICC,” she said.

    “But it’s a welcome development that Australia has now joined friends and allies in supporting international law.”

    “The foundational principle here is the defence of the rule of law and that is most important when the actions of powerful states threaten those fundamental principles.”

    The government has also been working with Australians employed by the ICC to help them “work through” the implications of the sanctions, although the Trump administration has offered a 180-day grace period before they are fully implemented.

    One official from a third country said it was “surreal” to watch Western diplomats working out how they could best shield their nationals from US sanctions.

    Professor Renshaw said the US sanctions would create a “very difficult problem” because US companies and financial institutions played a “central” role providing the court with legal, travel and banking services.

    “Australians who work for the court will need to know that the Australian government will support them carrying out their work when it’s made far more difficult, complex and perilous by the actions of the US,” she said.ABC Australia

     

     

     

     

     

  • Opposition links Turkish minister’s father to $17 million fund transactions

    Opposition links Turkish minister’s father to $17 million fund transactions

    AKP’s Family and Social Services Minister Mahinur Özdemir Göktaş faced calls Thursday to explain alleged fund transactions worth 830 million lira ($17 million) carried out in her father’s name, as an opposition lawmaker challenged government figures’ connections to the country’s investment fund scandal.

    Ümit Özlale, a lawmaker from the main opposition New Party, asked at a press conference whether her father, Hasan Özdemir, had traded in two funds caught up in the crisis.

    Özlale cited transaction reference numbers and maintained that he had documents supporting his allegations.

    His questions followed a parliamentary speech Wednesday in which he asked whether an unnamed minister had invested through a father’s account, turning 470 million lira ($9.5 million) into 830 million lira before withdrawing the money ahead of the crisis.

    Göktaş denied the allegations Thursday, declaring that neither she nor any family member had an account or conducted transactions in the funds concerned.

    She maintained that the investor was a different person with the same name as her father, citing different identification numbers, and pledged to resign if the allegations were proven, Gazete Pencere reported.

    Özlale argued that investments by ministers were not themselves crimes but demanded disclosure of any transactions benefiting from privileged treatment or information obtained through public office.

    The crisis began in September when funds could not meet withdrawal requests as share prices fell, prompting investigations into market manipulation.

    The Capital Markets Board (SPK), Turkey’s securities regulator, ordered 131 funds managed by seven companies to be closed and their assets sold to repay 455,758 investors.