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  • Turkey detains 72, arrests 41 over alleged Gülen links

    Turkey detains 72, arrests 41 over alleged Gülen links

    Turkish authorities detained 72 people over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement in recent operations, with courts ordering 41 of them jailed pending trial, the İlke TV news website reported Monday, citing the Interior Ministry.

    Gendarmes carried out the operations across 32 provinces, including İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Diyarbakır provinces, under the coordination of prosecutors and the force’s counterterrorism department. Legal procedures were continuing for the remaining 31 people, the ministry said, without specifying their custody status.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated him as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after a coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the attempted coup or any terrorist activity.

    The ministry’s allegations included continuing activities on behalf of the movement, maintaining contact with people it described as movement coordinators, providing financial support to charities it alleged were affiliated with the movement and posting content on social media that it characterized as terrorist propaganda.

    The official statement did not specify which allegations applied to which detainees, identify the charities or describe the social media posts cited as evidence.

    The ministry also said gendarmes seized documents and digital materials during the operations, without detailing their contents.

    According to the latest figures from the justice ministry, more than 127,000 people have been convicted for alleged links to the movement and authorities had initiated legal proceedings against 720,338 people since 2016, with 10,485 still in prison. Investigations or trials involving another 83,404 are still ongoing.

    In addition to the thousands who were jailed, scores of other Gülen movement followers had to flee Turkey to avoid the government crackdown.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • Turkey detains 10 over alleged Gülen links in 3 provinces

    Turkey detains 10 over alleged Gülen links in 3 provinces

    Turkish police detained 10 people on Friday over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement in raids across three provinces, the TRT Haber state broadcaster reported.

    The simultaneous raids took place in İstanbul and the western provinces of Aydın and İzmir. Police alleged that some of those detained had previously held coordinating roles in the movement and had resumed those activities.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated him as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after a coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the attempted coup or any terrorist activity.

    The authorities also cited alleged past use of ByLock, an encrypted messaging app that was available on Apple’s App Store and Google Play, and increases in deposits at Bank Asya before its closure. They in addition named the alleged collection of donations on behalf of the movement and the organizing of religious discussion meetings.

    Since the coup attempt in 2016, the Turkish government has accepted such activities as having an account at the now-shuttered Bank Asya, one of Turkey’s largest commercial banks at the time; using the ByLock messaging application; and subscribing to the now-shut-down Zaman daily or other publications affiliated with members of the movement as benchmarks for identifying and arresting alleged followers of the Gülen movement on charges of membership in a terrorist organization.

    Turkish authorities have considered ByLock to be a secret tool of communication among supporters of the Gülen movement since the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, despite a lack of evidence that ByLock messages were related to the abortive putsch.

    Although the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has in many cases made clear that use of the ByLock messaging app does not constitute a criminal offense, detentions and arrests of individuals continue in Turkey for their alleged use of the ByLock application.

    Police said they seized Turkish lira, foreign currency and gold worth 12.85 million lira (about $257,000), along with digital materials and documents they described as related to the movement.

    The detainees were taken to police headquarters. The reports did not identify them or include statements from their lawyers.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • Aliyev to skip Ankara summit despite Erdoğan’s invitation amid Turkey-Azerbaijan tensions

    Aliyev to skip Ankara summit despite Erdoğan’s invitation amid Turkey-Azerbaijan tensions

    Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev will not attend Friday’s Organization of Turkic States (OTS) summit in Ankara, Azerbaijani media reported Thursday, amid tensions between the two close allies over Turkey’s criticism of restrictions on headscarves in Azerbaijani schools.

    Aliyev will be represented by Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov at the October 30 summit, according to the Azerbaijani Report Information Agency, which attributed his absence to previously scheduled engagements and a busy work schedule.

    The agency reported that Aliyev would attend the final and closing ceremony of the inaugural FIFA U-15 World Cup and Festival in Baku on Friday and present awards to the finalists. It said his participation in the ceremony had been arranged in advance.

    The announcement comes despite Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s personal invitation to Aliyev during an October 21 telephone conversation and the departure of Erdoğan’s chief presidential adviser, Oktay Saral, following a dispute over Azerbaijan’s restrictions on headscarves in schools.

    Saral criticized the restrictions in an October 12 post on X, saying it was unacceptable to prevent students wearing headscarves from exercising their right to education.

    Azerbaijan amended its school uniform regulations in September to prohibit clothing considered inconsistent with prescribed uniforms or secular education. Although the regulations do not explicitly mention headscarves, some students wearing them have reportedly been turned away from classes.

    Saral’s remarks prompted a sharp response from Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party, which accused Turkish political figures of interfering in the country’s domestic affairs.

    In an October 25 interview with journalist Talat Atilla, Saral said he was leaving his position on Erdoğan’s instructions. Asked whether his departure was connected to his criticism of Azerbaijan, he replied, “Yes, it seems so.”

    Saral announced his resignation the following day.

    Middle East Eye had reported that Azerbaijan demanded Saral’s dismissal and legal action against Turkish commentators accused of insulting Aliyev.

    The dispute has also resulted in measures against Turkish citizens. Azerbaijan has barred 31 Turkish nationals, including journalists, political figures and religious commentators, from entering the country and issued arrest warrants for seven others over statements related to the controversy.

    Tensions between Ankara and Baku predate the headscarf controversy, Azerbaijani political analyst Arastun Orujlu told Meydan TV, an independent Azerbaijani news outlet operating in exile.

    He identified Azerbaijan’s increasingly close ties with Israel as a major source of friction, pointing to broader competition between Turkey and Israel for influence in the South Caucasus.

    Despite the tensions, Aliyev sent Erdoğan a message Thursday congratulating Turkey on the 103rd anniversary of the founding of the republic.

    He described Azerbaijan and Turkey as bound by genuine ties of friendship and brotherhood and said the 2021 Shusha Declaration had elevated their relationship to the level of an alliance.

    The announcement of his absence from the summit came later that day.

    Bayramov, who will represent Azerbaijan at the summit, attended Thursday’s meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers in Ankara and met with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan.

    The ministers discussed bilateral relations and regional and international developments, according to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry.

    Friday’s summit, hosted by Erdoğan, will mark Turkey’s taking over the organization’s rotating chairmanship from Azerbaijan.

    The OTS, which brings together Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, promotes political, economic and cultural cooperation among Turkic-speaking countries.

    According to the organization’s official announcement, the leaders are expected to discuss trade, transportation, energy and institutional cooperation, appoint a new secretary-general and adopt the Ankara Declaration.

    Turkey and Azerbaijan maintain close military, energy and transportation ties and frequently describe their relationship as “one nation, two states.”

  • Thousands protest media crackdown in Turkey

    Thousands protest media crackdown in Turkey

    Thousands rallied in İstanbul and Ankara on Saturday against what they described as growing pressure on journalists in Turkey, including arrests, media shutdowns and the appointment of government administrators to run news outlets.

    Press freedom has been increasingly constrained in Turkey since a failed coup attempt in 2016, with sweeping prosecutions, digital censorship and government accusations that journalists are spreading fake news.

    “Enough!” shouted marchers, mainly journalists, rights activists and opposition party representatives. “We can no longer breathe!”

    On İstanbul’s Asian side, protesters held up photos of jailed journalists, chanting: “We will not be silenced. Enough is enough!” and “We will not bow to pressure”.

    At least 3,000 people attended each protest, according to police counts.

    Recent weeks have seen what rights advocates describe as mounting pressure on independent journalism.

    Eleven journalists have been jailed in the past two months and several media outlets shut down, according to the Turkish Journalists’ Union (TGS).

    Earlier this month, police raided Turkey’s most-watched news channel, Halk TV, halting broadcasts and installing a government-appointed administrator.

    The takeover was the latest move against media outlets seen as critical of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government.

    It followed the blocking of leading digital news outlet T24’s website and social media accounts over what Turkish officials described as “LGBT propaganda”.

    ‘Intimidation’

    “This gathering is not simply about standing up for journalists,” veteran journalist Zafer Arapkirli told Agence France-Presse after the İstanbul protest.

    “It is also about defending respect for society’s right to access information and news through journalists and independent media,” said the columnist for the BirGün daily.

    Arapkirli, who himself faces lawsuits, said the response and determination to resist must grow as the pressure intensifies.

    “What the regime wants is to intimidate, silence and frighten society through such pressure — by arresting individual journalists, seizing media outlets, banning news coverage and blocking access to social media,” he said.

    “We must show that we will not allow this to happen.

    “We have done so up to now. I believe we are now moving towards demonstrating this determination on a much larger scale”.

    TGS President Gökhan Durmuş said the nature of “the government’s attacks” on the media had changed.

    “If we look at the recent restrictions, access bans and trustee appointments, they have targeted some of the most widely followed and watched broadcasters, news channels and media platforms,” he told AFP.

    “We are seeing a system emerge in which everything is uniform: one voice, one source of news, one centralised operation,” he said.

    ‘Let us do our job’

    In Ankara, protesters chanted against censorship and called for the release of jailed journalists.

    “Today’s protest was important both because it brought journalists together to make their voices heard and because it defended citizens’ right to access information,” T24 journalist Gökçer Tahincioğlu told AFP in Ankara.

    “Journalists are determined to get one message across: we want to practise journalism, and we want to be able to do so freely,” he said.

    The government has repeatedly denied that journalists are arrested or imprisoned for doing their jobs.

    At the Ankara protest, a letter from jailed BirGün journalist İsmail Arı was read to the crowd.

    “I am being held in prison for no reason other than doing my job as a journalist. Days are being stolen from my life,” Arı wrote from Sincan prison on the outskirts of Ankara.

    “We will defend journalism to the very end. Take your hands off us, comply with the constitution and let us do our job.”

    Arı was jailed pending trial on October 21 for the second time in seven months, accused of publicly disseminating misleading information following a complaint by former broadcasting watchdog chief Ebubekir Şahin. He was also investigated on suspicion of insulting a public official.

    © Agence France-Presse

  • [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    Adem Yavuz Arslan* 

    For Turkish citizens trying to understand whether their country could become embroiled in Yemen’s war, the most revealing recent statement came from Washington.

    Speaking to reporters before departing for Alaska on October 13, President Donald Trump suggested he might ask Turkey to help counter Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. He appeared confident about the answer: “President Erdogan, I think, would do as I ask.”

    There is no announced Turkish combat deployment to Yemen. Trump’s remark establishes neither that a request has been made nor that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has accepted one. But it raises a question with implications beyond the conflict: Why does an American president speak so confidently about his ability to secure another country’s military cooperation?

    Part of the answer may lie in Trump’s habitual exaggeration of his influence. Another part lies in the way Erdoğan governs. By concentrating authority at home and making personal access central to foreign policy, Turkey’s president has made himself the indispensable negotiating partner. He has also made his own vulnerabilities more consequential for the country.

    The Yemen crisis could test how much room that leaves him to refuse Washington.

    Turkey’s involvement already extends beyond diplomatic expressions of solidarity. Ankara had decided to provide Saudi Arabia with defensive and technical assistance, including drone operators, intelligence sharing and logistical support, according to an October 7 Reuters report citing Turkish and US officials.

    The broader framework is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August. Its publicly announced principle is sweeping: An armed attack on one signatory is to be treated as an attack on all three. That establishes a collective security commitment but does not, by itself, explain which military actions each government must undertake in a particular crisis.

    Parliament had yet to approve the agreement when Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed it on October 8. He ruled out Turkish participation in offensive operations while describing support for Saudi Arabia’s defense.

    On October 15 Turkey’s Defense Ministry said parliamentary approval of the agreement and the necessary authorization procedures for sending Turkish forces abroad had yet to be completed. Reuters reported that assistance provided before ratification was largely bilateral.

    Erdoğan has left greater flexibility. In responses to Newsweek published on September 25, he said the extent of assistance would depend on the threat and could include more advanced military support. He also cautioned against assuming that every incident would automatically trigger a military response.

    These statements leave substantial questions unanswered about the limits of Turkey’s commitment. They do not justify claiming that Ankara has already agreed to fight in Yemen. Nor does Trump’s confidence prove that Washington possesses a secret undertaking. It does, however, sharpen the need to explain how Turkish decisions will be made — and whose priorities will determine them.

    Saudi Arabia has compelling reasons to seek help. Houthi attacks have brought the war into the kingdom’s economic and political centers. A strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on October 10 killed at least 13 people and wounded more than 300.

    The threat reaches beyond the immediate casualties. Disrupted aviation, vulnerable energy infrastructure and uncertainty over the security of major cities undermine the conditions on which Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation depends.

    Military assistance would also carry substantial risks. The Houthis have demonstrated an ability to penetrate defenses supplied at enormous expense, exposing the difficulty of protecting a vast territory against adaptable missile and drone attacks.

    For Turkey, helping intercept an incoming missile and joining a campaign against launch sites inside Yemen would entail different objectives, legal questions and risks. Yet those missions can become connected. Personnel sent to operate defensive equipment may require protection. An attack on them may generate pressure for retaliation. Retaliation may create demands for further operations.

    Such escalation is a possibility, not an inevitability. Preventing it requires that clear limits be established before a deployment becomes politically difficult to reverse.

    Trump’s language offers little reassurance that he views those limits as central.

    On June 24, during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, he praised Erdoğan and Turkey’s military while saying he had asked the Turkish leader to stay out of the Iran war and that Erdoğan had complied.

    Whether that account accurately captures Ankara’s reasoning is a separate matter. Its significance lies in the relationship Trump presents to the public: He makes a request and Erdoğan delivers.

    Erdoğan benefits from this presentation in one respect. A friendly American president offers recognition and access. But the same arrangement allows Trump to portray Turkey’s policy choices as personal accommodations.

    That can weaken Erdoğan’s negotiating position. If cooperation is publicly treated as evidence of friendship, refusal becomes a test of the relationship. A disagreement over national interests acquires the character of a personal rebuff.

    Trump has previously shown that praise can coexist with coercion. In October 2019 he threatened to destroy Turkey’s economy and sent Erdoğan a letter containing the admonition, “Don’t be a fool!”

    The friendly language of the present cannot erase that history. Erdoğan is dealing with a president who has demonstrated a willingness to use economic pressure against Turkey and to advertise that pressure publicly.

    The resolution of the Halkbank prosecution adds another dimension.

    On June 17 US District Judge Richard Berman dismissed the criminal indictment against the Turkish state-owned lender after an agreement with the Trump administration. The decision ended a prosecution that had weighed on relations between the two countries for years.

    There is no public evidence connecting that outcome to a Turkish commitment over Yemen. Any claim of an exchange would exceed the available facts.

    Nevertheless, a favorable outcome in a politically important case can influence a relationship without a documented bargain. Trump may regard the resolution as an accomplishment for which Erdoğan owes him consideration. Whether Erdoğan shares that understanding is unknown.

    The distinction matters. An analysis of potential leverage should not become an allegation of a secret deal. But neither should the absence of evidence for a specific bargain end scrutiny of the incentives surrounding future decisions.

    Turkey’s exposure to financial pressure supplies another constraint. A confrontation with Washington can affect investor expectations and the perceived stability of the economy. For any Turkish government, those costs would require consideration. In a system centered on one leader, they may also intersect with concerns about political survival and international acceptance.

    Erdoğan is not without leverage. Turkey’s military capabilities and strategic position give Washington reasons to seek cooperation. His willingness to pursue policies opposed by Western allies also makes blanket descriptions of obedience unconvincing.

    The question is narrower: Can he use Turkey’s assets to negotiate clear limits, or does his reliance on a personal relationship make those limits harder to defend?

    Accountability is essential to answering it.

    Unresolved corruption allegations and politically sensitive financial cases become foreign policy concerns when the public cannot determine whether they influence decisions. Their existence does not prove that a leader is being coerced. The danger arises when independent institutions cannot credibly investigate potential conflicts between the leader’s interests and those of the state.

    Under those conditions even a defensible military decision can become difficult to assess. Citizens cannot know whether their government is responding to a genuine security threat, honoring a clearly defined obligation or protecting a relationship whose full terms remain beyond scrutiny.

    Religious solidarity could further complicate that assessment. A deployment presented as protecting Mecca and Medina would carry emotional force in Turkey. But the protection of holy sites cannot settle questions about command, geographic limits, escalation or withdrawal. Those require specific answers.

    The decisive issue, then, is not Erdoğan’s personal courage in confronting Trump. It is whether Turkey has a decision-making process capable of distinguishing the country’s interests from its president’s needs.

    Before any expanded military commitment, Ankara should explain the threat it intends to address, the limits of its mission and the conditions for ending it. Parliament and the public need enough information to judge those choices.

    Trump may believe Erdoğan will do as he asks. Turkey’s institutions should ensure that belief is never sufficient grounds for sending Turkish soldiers to war.

    *Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

    [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

     

    When allegations emerged that Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, a former minister and one of the most senior figures in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP,) and her husband had turned a combined investment of about 163 million Turkish lira ($3.3 million) into more than 2 billion lira (about $41 million) in proceeds from stock sales within months, Kaya resigned from her positions in the party.

    The figures were recently disclosed by opposition politician Zeynel Emre.

    Yet while Turkey and the world were watching what has been described as one of the country’s biggest financial scandals, Kaya had been part of Erdoğan’s delegation at the United Nations summit, appearing as though nothing unusual had happened.

    The Kaya couple, who are widely regarded as being close to the Erdoğan family and his political circle, reportedly invested about 163 million lira between them, much of it in Özata Denizcilik shares, beginning in April 2026.

    According to allegations made by New Party spokesperson Emre, Kaya invested about 63.4 million lira ($1.3 million) and later withdrew about 1.34 billion lira ($27.3 million), while her husband, İlyas Kaya, invested about 99.7 million lira ($2 million) and withdrew about 826 million lira ($16.9 million). Emre alleged that they sold their holdings before the financial crisis and market turmoil that erupted in mid-September.

    Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Turkish investors were caught in the collapse. The crisis has affected more than 450,000 investors across 131 funds, with more than $18 billion in assets held in funds now being liquidated.

    The Kaya couple have reportedly transferred approximately 2.2 billion lira ($44.9 million) to an account designated by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance.

    But returning the money does not, by itself, establish that they committed a crime or constitute a legal admission of wrongdoing. Their transactions, their source of information and the circumstances surrounding the trades still require independent investigation.

    Prosecutors have since moved to freeze the assets of Kaya and her husband as part of the fund investigation.

    That raises much bigger questions.

    Why did no one in Erdoğan’s government seriously ask how a senior ruling-party figure and her husband acquired the capital to make such a large investment, why they invested in this particular stock at precisely that time, and how they managed to exit after such a spectacular rise in its value?

    How can a stock rise so dramatically in only a few months without attracting extraordinary scrutiny? And when such extraordinary and potentially manipulative movements occur, why did the institutions responsible for monitoring the stock market and protecting investors fail to intervene earlier?

    These questions are particularly important because the institutions responsible for regulating and overseeing Turkey’s financial markets are headed by people appointed by the government and operating within Erdoğan’s political system.

    And there is an even bigger question.

    How was a crisis involving 131 funds with assets worth more than $18 billion allowed to develop in the first place? Who benefited from the extraordinary price movements now under investigation?

    There is also a striking contrast in the way Erdoğan’s government treats political opponents and figures close to the ruling establishment. Opposition figures, including İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have been arrested and imprisoned amid corruption allegations. In Kaya’s case, prosecutors have now moved to freeze her and her husband’s assets, but neither has been detained or charged over the alleged trades. Where is the same level of scrutiny?

    And why did Kaya remain silent when the allegations first emerged? Her resignation statement said she was stepping aside so the allegations could be investigated independently, but she did not directly address Emre’s detailed claims about the trades.

    If opposition politicians had not publicly disclosed her name and the details of the transactions, would she have voluntarily come forward to explain how she and her husband had allegedly made such extraordinary gains from these trades?

    But perhaps the most painful question is not financial. It is moral.

    Erdoğan, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya and many other figures in the ruling party regularly present themselves to the public through religious language, symbols and imagery.

    What happens to religion when politicians who invoke it so frequently become associated with privilege, extraordinary wealth and allegations of corruption?

    What happens when religious language becomes a political shield against demands for transparency and accountability?

    What does it do to faith when politicians who constantly invoke Islam and religious values are accused of benefiting from extraordinary financial transactions while ordinary citizens bear the losses?

    And do genuinely religious people recognize the damage that this kind of Islamist politics, using religion as a political shield, can inflict on religion itself?

    The AKP’s rise to power was fueled in large part by the sense of grievance created in the 1990s, when Turkey’s secular establishment imposed severe restrictions on women who wore the headscarf, particularly in universities and public institutions.

    Today, however, the AKP has taken the repression it once condemned to a level far beyond what those old regimes imposed on their opponents. And there is a particularly striking irony in the fact that one of the figures now at the center of corruption allegations is herself a woman who wears the headscarf.

    Sadly, this also seems to have vindicated the warnings that Islamist politicians may embrace democracy, justice and freedoms most enthusiastically when they are in opposition. Once they gain power, the temptation can be to treat those principles as instruments rather than universal values.

    Erdoğan himself has long been widely quoted as expressing such an instrumental view of democracy during his years as mayor of İstanbul: “Democracy is like a tram. You ride it until you reach your destination, then you get off.”

    *Abdülhamit Bilici is the former editor-in-chief of the now-defunct Zaman daily who currently lives in exile in Washington, D.C.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • Turkey probes TR724 news outlet over coverage of crackdown on Süleymanlılar religious group

    Turkey probes TR724 news outlet over coverage of crackdown on Süleymanlılar religious group

     

    Turkish prosecutors have launched an investigation into TR724, a Turkish media outlet established by journalists in exile, over its coverage of an ongoing crackdown on the Süleymanlılar religious community and developments surrounding the suspicious death of one of its former leaders.

    The Bakırköy Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office said on September 10 that it had opened the investigation under Article 217/A of the Turkish Penal Code, commonly known as Turkey’s “disinformation law,” accusing TR724 of publishing “false, manipulative and misleading” content about the 2016 death of former transport minister Arif Ahmet Denizolgun, who was also a former leader of the Süleymanlılar.

    The prosecutor’s office did not identify a specific TR724 report, piece of information or statement that it considered false or explain what evidence contradicted the outlet’s reporting.

    Prosecutors said they instructed the İstanbul Police Department’s security branch to identify statements made in TR724’s social media broadcasts, establish the identities and addresses of the people involved and carry out the necessary judicial procedures.

    The statement did not announce detention warrants for any TR724 journalists.

    TR724 described the investigation as an attempt to silence the outlet over its coverage of the crackdown on the Süleymanlılar, a religious community that has not endorsed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), saying it has closely followed the operations since they began in August and reported both the authorities’ allegations and developments surrounding Denizolgun’s death.

    The former minister’s death in 2016 became the subject of a renewed investigation this year, leading to the exhumation of his remains in August.

    Prosecutors later recovered video of his original autopsy after authorities had initially said no recording could be found. A subsequent forensic report classified his death as suspicious and said an intentional killing could not be ruled out.

    The findings led prosecutors to investigate current Süleymanlılar leader Alihan Kuriş and several others for murder.

    Despite these developments having been publicly announced by the authorities, the Bakırköy prosecutor’s office did not specify which part of TR724’s reporting it considers false or misleading.

    Police launched raids across 17 provinces on August 13 as part of the crackdown targeting Süleymanlılar, in an Ankara-based investigation involving allegations including running a criminal organization, money laundering, fraud and tax violations.

    Prosecutors issued detention warrants for 49 people in the first phase, and Kuriş and 31 others were subsequently jailed pending trial. The investigation later expanded, with additional arrests and the seizure of companies and associations linked to the group.

    Justice Minister Akın Gürlek has denied that the government is targeting a religious group, describing the case as a financial crimes investigation directed at its leadership. He said Thursday that Turkey had also requested judicial assistance from Germany over transfers of funds abroad.

    The Süleymanlılar have never built close ties with Erdoğan or the AKP and have at times backed opposition parties. Observers view the operation as a warning that religious communities could face state pressure if their political positions displeased the government.

    The operations followed months of criticism of the group by politicians and media figures close to the government.

    The Süleymanlılar trace their roots to Quran teaching begun by Islamic scholar Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan in the 1920s and now run courses, dormitories, charities and businesses in Turkey and Europe.

    Article 217/A, which took effect in 2022, makes it a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in prison to publicly disseminate false information on certain matters in a way deemed capable of causing fear, panic or concern. Press freedom groups have repeatedly called for its repeal, saying it has been used to criminalize legitimate journalism.