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  • Helen Haines’ condition improves following alleged attack, but remains serious

    Helen Haines’ condition improves following alleged attack, but remains serious

    Independent MP Helen Haines is in serious but stable condition after days hospitalised in a critical condition and the amputation of both her legs.

    Melbourne’s Alfred Hospital provided the update on Saturday morning, on the fifth day since Haines was struck by a vehicle outside her electorate office in regional Victoria on Monday afternoon. She had been in a critical condition since the incident.

    Police allege the incident in Wangaratta was a deliberate attack by 43-year-old Tarrawingee man Brendan Nugent, who has been charged with dangerous driving causing serious injury, intentionally causing serious injury and causing harm to a Commonwealth public official. He allegedly made a sharp U-turn before striking Haines in a Toyota LandCruiser.

    Nugent faced Wangaratta Magistrates’ Court on Wednesday.

    The MP’s husband Phil Haines said on Wednesday Haines’ right leg had also been amputated despite the best efforts of doctors.

    “The good news in all this is that she’s alive. That is the most important thing for our family,” he said at the time.

    The incident has triggered an outpouring of shock and grief across the political spectrum and the country.

    A number of federal politicians have spoken out about the rising temperature in politics and the uptick in threats they have faced.

    The investigation into the incident is ongoing.

  • 19 more jailed in investigation targeting Süleymanlılar religious community

    19 more jailed in investigation targeting Süleymanlılar religious community

    A Turkish court has ordered the pretrial detention of 19 people in the latest phase of a financial crimes investigation targeting individuals linked to the Süleymanlılar religious community, the DHA news agency reported on Friday.

    Five others were released under judicial supervision after 24 suspects were brought before a court following questioning by police and prosecutors.

    The decisions follow the fifth round of raids in the investigation, led by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Police searched 28 homes and 16 workplaces across 12 provinces after prosecutors issued detention warrants for 38 people.

    Twenty-two people were initially detained in the October 19 raids. The number subsequently rose to 24, according to DHA.

    Prosecutors are investigating allegations of establishing, leading or belonging to a criminal organization, money laundering, defrauding public institutions and violations of tax laws.

    The investigation has targeted community leader Alihan Kuriş, who has been jailed pending trial since August. Kuriş has denied leading a criminal organization or participating in money laundering or fraud.

    The case has expanded through successive operations targeting people and businesses linked to the community. In September, prosecutors issued warrants for 29 suspects and secured the appointment of court-supervised trustees to 23 companies.

    The Süleymanlılar trace their roots to Islamic scholar Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. The community runs Quran courses, student dormitories, charities and businesses in Turkey and Europe, particularly Germany. Kuriş, a grandson of Tunahan, became its leader in 2016.

    The investigation has prompted questions about possible political motives. The community has remained outside President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) close circle of religious allies and has at times reportedly supported opposition parties.

    Former education minister Hüseyin Çelik, a founding AKP member, warned in August that investigations into religious communities risked becoming a way to punish groups whose leaders opposed the government.

    He questioned whether the Süleymanlılar would have faced similar action had their leadership supported the ruling party.

    The government denies targeting the community over its beliefs or political position. Justice Minister Akın Gürlek has claimed that the investigation concerns alleged financial crimes rather than religious activities.

  • Azerbaijan seeks to contain Azerbaijan dispute ahead of regional summit

    Azerbaijan seeks to contain Azerbaijan dispute ahead of regional summit

    Turkey is seeking to contain a growing dispute with Azerbaijan over criticism of school headscarf restrictions, as reports of demands from Baku and uncertainty over President Ilham Aliyev’s attendance at an upcoming regional summit put the relationship under pressure.

    Azerbaijan’s decision to bar 31 Turkish nationals from entering the country on Wednesday expanded the dispute beyond the seven Turkish citizens facing arrest in absentia over alleged calls to overthrow the Azerbaijani government. The entry ban list includes opposition politicians, media figures and religious writers, with Azerbaijani officials accusing those named of making statements that threaten the country’s sovereignty and national security.

    The dispute began after Azerbaijan amended its school uniform rules on September 21 to prohibit clothing considered incompatible with prescribed uniforms or secular education. Although the rules do not explicitly mention headscarves, reports that girls wearing them were turned away from classrooms prompted protests and criticism from Turkish politicians.

    On October 12 Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, called the restrictions unacceptable and urged Azerbaijan to reverse them. Members of Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) also criticized the policy. The following day, Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) accused Saral and AKP lawmakers of making “populist and irresponsible” statements and interfering in the country’s domestic affairs.

    A Middle East Eye report published October 19, citing three officials and a source familiar with the matter, said Baku had asked Ankara to dismiss Saral, prosecute social media commentators who had insulted Aliyev and block accounts identified by Azerbaijani officials. Turkey blocked some of the accounts but had taken no further action.

    Azerbaijani media outlets close to the government subsequently accused Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan of encouraging unrest against Aliyev following Fidan’s visit to Baku. The Turkish Embassy rejected the allegations, denying that Fidan had held secret meetings or issued instructions to interfere in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs. Azerbaijani news outlet Qafqazinfo removed passages targeting Fidan after the embassy’s denial. Azerbaijan’s Press Council also criticized some Turkish media coverage, accusing outlets of exceeding the bounds of press freedom.

    Turkish political figures have sought to limit the fallout. Former prime minister Binali Yıldırım said Saral’s comments did not represent official Turkish policy, while Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli called for common sense.

    The dispute comes as Turkey and Azerbaijan prepare for the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Ankara, where Turkey is due to take over the group’s chairmanship from Azerbaijan. Foreign ministers are scheduled to meet on October 29, followed by the heads-of-state summit on October 30.

    Turkish Foreign Ministry sources told the Cumhuriyet newspaper that all leaders had been invited and that Aliyev’s attendance was expected. Middle East Eye’s sources, however, said his participation remained unconfirmed.

    Separately, Turkey’s Center for Combating Disinformation, part of the Presidential Communications Directorate, said on October 20 that social media claims that someone had attempted to remove the Turkish flag in Azerbaijan relied on old footage. The center said the flag had not been taken down and accused those circulating the footage as recent of seeking to damage relations between the two countries.

    Azerbaijan’s Interior Ministry has said 37 people were detained during protests against enforcement of the school uniform rules. The dispute has put pressure on a relationship built on close political, military and cultural ties, which the two governments often describe with the phrase “one nation, two states.”

  • Victorian Opposition pledges advertising support for independent multicultural media

    Victorian Opposition pledges advertising support for independent multicultural media

    Victoria’s Liberal and Nationals Opposition has pledged to direct a greater share of government advertising expenditure to independent multicultural media outlets if elected in November. Independent Multicultural Media Australia (IMMA) has welcomed the commitment and called on all political parties to adopt the same policy.

    Victorian Opposition Leader Jess Wilson and Shadow Minister for Multicultural and Multifaith Affairs Evan Mulholland announced the commitment on Monday, 19 October 2026.

    Under the proposal, a Wilson-led government would review Victoria’s existing commitment to allocate 15 per cent of government advertising expenditure to multicultural media and require at least half of the digital spending within that allocation to go directly to eligible independent multicultural media outlets.

    The policy would cover advertising on publishers’ websites, applications, newsletters, streaming services and publisher-owned social media channels.

    The commitment adopts Recommendation 25(a) of Victoria’s Multicultural Review.

    Advertising expenditure flowing to global platforms

    In a media statement issued on 21 October, IMMA said much of the advertising expenditure intended for multicultural communities had been directed to global platforms such as Meta and Google rather than independent multicultural media outlets.

    IMMA said it had raised this issue over several years and noted that Victoria’s Multicultural Review had reached the same conclusion.

    The Opposition’s announcement followed a meeting between Wilson, Mulholland, IMMA Chair Christopher Gogos and Deputy Chair Julius Larobina.

    Christopher Gogos welcomes the commitment

    IMMA Chair Christopher Gogos described the commitment as a significant step for the sector.

    “For years, money set aside to reach multicultural communities has gone to global platforms instead of the local outlets doing the work — in language or within the community, on the ground, every day. This commitment recognises that gap and does something practical to address it.”

    IMMA calls on all political parties to match the commitment

    Gogos also called on all political parties to make the same commitment ahead of Victoria’s November election.

    “We thank Jess Wilson and Evan Mulholland for engaging with this issue and with the findings of the Review. As a non-partisan organisation we encourage all parties to match this commitment, so that whoever forms government after November, Victoria’s multicultural media has a fair share of the advertising spend meant for the communities it serves.”

    About IMMA

    Independent Multicultural Media Australia (IMMA) is the national peak body for independent multicultural media, representing around 60 member organisations publishing more than 137 titles in over 30 languages across print, digital, radio and broadcast.

  • Erdoğan says Turkey shut or took over Gülen-linked schools in over 50 countries, vows to press on

    Erdoğan says Turkey shut or took over Gülen-linked schools in over 50 countries, vows to press on

    Turkey has secured the closure or takeover of schools linked to the faith-based Gülen movement in more than 50 countries, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Thursday, vowing to continue his government’s campaign against the group abroad.

    Speaking at an event in Ankara marking the 10th anniversary of the state-run Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV), Erdoğan praised the foundation’s takeover of schools previously associated with the movement and credited the Foreign Ministry, the foundation and other government institutions with carrying out the campaign abroad. He said the campaign had intensified after a July 2016 coup attempt.

    Erdoğan also described the Gülen movement as a “network of treachery” and its schools “dens of sedition,” saying its supporters would become “much more pitiable, much more wretched.” The remarks reflect a longstanding pattern of hate speech, with Erdoğan and other government officials portraying the movement’s followers as internal enemies and using dehumanizing language to legitimize their persecution, while pro-government media have amplified the rhetoric.

    Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdoğan as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after the coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the attempted coup or any terrorist activity.

    Erdoğan did not identify the countries involved, specify how many schools were affected or say where closures had been complete or partial.

    A July 2026 report by the human rights group Solidarity with Others documented the closure, confiscation or transfer of at least 162 Gülen-linked educational institutions in 29 countries, based on data compiled through March 2023. Of those, 131 were taken over directly by the Turkish Maarif Foundation. The report estimated that approximately 7,800 employees were affected.

    Since the July 2016 coup attempt, Ankara has pressed foreign governments to close or transfer Gülen-linked schools to the TMV, part of a broader campaign against perceived opponents abroad that human rights organizations have described as transnational repression.

    The foundation is the only organization other than Turkey’s Education Ministry authorized to open schools overseas on behalf of the Turkish state.

    The campaign has also extended beyond school closures and takeovers to the educators themselves. SCF has documented cases of educators associated with the Gülen movement being abducted or forcibly returned to Turkey from countries including Kosovo, Pakistan, Malaysia and Myanmar. Many Turkish teachers at schools targeted for takeover fled their host countries, fearing arrest or extradition, and sought refuge in Europe, the United States or Canada.

    The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) cited Freedom House data listing Turkey among the world’s 10 leading perpetrators of physical transnational repression in a June resolution. The rights group documented 160 such incidents attributed to Turkey from 2014 through 2025.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    [OPINION] Can Erdoğan say no to Trump?

    Adem Yavuz Arslan* 

    For Turkish citizens trying to understand whether their country could become embroiled in Yemen’s war, the most revealing recent statement came from Washington.

    Speaking to reporters before departing for Alaska on October 13, President Donald Trump suggested he might ask Turkey to help counter Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. He appeared confident about the answer: “President Erdogan, I think, would do as I ask.”

    There is no announced Turkish combat deployment to Yemen. Trump’s remark establishes neither that a request has been made nor that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has accepted one. But it raises a question with implications beyond the conflict: Why does an American president speak so confidently about his ability to secure another country’s military cooperation?

    Part of the answer may lie in Trump’s habitual exaggeration of his influence. Another part lies in the way Erdoğan governs. By concentrating authority at home and making personal access central to foreign policy, Turkey’s president has made himself the indispensable negotiating partner. He has also made his own vulnerabilities more consequential for the country.

    The Yemen crisis could test how much room that leaves him to refuse Washington.

    Turkey’s involvement already extends beyond diplomatic expressions of solidarity. Ankara had decided to provide Saudi Arabia with defensive and technical assistance, including drone operators, intelligence sharing and logistical support, according to an October 7 Reuters report citing Turkish and US officials.

    The broader framework is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August. Its publicly announced principle is sweeping: An armed attack on one signatory is to be treated as an attack on all three. That establishes a collective security commitment but does not, by itself, explain which military actions each government must undertake in a particular crisis.

    Parliament had yet to approve the agreement when Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed it on October 8. He ruled out Turkish participation in offensive operations while describing support for Saudi Arabia’s defense.

    On October 15 Turkey’s Defense Ministry said parliamentary approval of the agreement and the necessary authorization procedures for sending Turkish forces abroad had yet to be completed. Reuters reported that assistance provided before ratification was largely bilateral.

    Erdoğan has left greater flexibility. In responses to Newsweek published on September 25, he said the extent of assistance would depend on the threat and could include more advanced military support. He also cautioned against assuming that every incident would automatically trigger a military response.

    These statements leave substantial questions unanswered about the limits of Turkey’s commitment. They do not justify claiming that Ankara has already agreed to fight in Yemen. Nor does Trump’s confidence prove that Washington possesses a secret undertaking. It does, however, sharpen the need to explain how Turkish decisions will be made — and whose priorities will determine them.

    Saudi Arabia has compelling reasons to seek help. Houthi attacks have brought the war into the kingdom’s economic and political centers. A strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on October 10 killed at least 13 people and wounded more than 300.

    The threat reaches beyond the immediate casualties. Disrupted aviation, vulnerable energy infrastructure and uncertainty over the security of major cities undermine the conditions on which Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation depends.

    Military assistance would also carry substantial risks. The Houthis have demonstrated an ability to penetrate defenses supplied at enormous expense, exposing the difficulty of protecting a vast territory against adaptable missile and drone attacks.

    For Turkey, helping intercept an incoming missile and joining a campaign against launch sites inside Yemen would entail different objectives, legal questions and risks. Yet those missions can become connected. Personnel sent to operate defensive equipment may require protection. An attack on them may generate pressure for retaliation. Retaliation may create demands for further operations.

    Such escalation is a possibility, not an inevitability. Preventing it requires that clear limits be established before a deployment becomes politically difficult to reverse.

    Trump’s language offers little reassurance that he views those limits as central.

    On June 24, during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, he praised Erdoğan and Turkey’s military while saying he had asked the Turkish leader to stay out of the Iran war and that Erdoğan had complied.

    Whether that account accurately captures Ankara’s reasoning is a separate matter. Its significance lies in the relationship Trump presents to the public: He makes a request and Erdoğan delivers.

    Erdoğan benefits from this presentation in one respect. A friendly American president offers recognition and access. But the same arrangement allows Trump to portray Turkey’s policy choices as personal accommodations.

    That can weaken Erdoğan’s negotiating position. If cooperation is publicly treated as evidence of friendship, refusal becomes a test of the relationship. A disagreement over national interests acquires the character of a personal rebuff.

    Trump has previously shown that praise can coexist with coercion. In October 2019 he threatened to destroy Turkey’s economy and sent Erdoğan a letter containing the admonition, “Don’t be a fool!”

    The friendly language of the present cannot erase that history. Erdoğan is dealing with a president who has demonstrated a willingness to use economic pressure against Turkey and to advertise that pressure publicly.

    The resolution of the Halkbank prosecution adds another dimension.

    On June 17 US District Judge Richard Berman dismissed the criminal indictment against the Turkish state-owned lender after an agreement with the Trump administration. The decision ended a prosecution that had weighed on relations between the two countries for years.

    There is no public evidence connecting that outcome to a Turkish commitment over Yemen. Any claim of an exchange would exceed the available facts.

    Nevertheless, a favorable outcome in a politically important case can influence a relationship without a documented bargain. Trump may regard the resolution as an accomplishment for which Erdoğan owes him consideration. Whether Erdoğan shares that understanding is unknown.

    The distinction matters. An analysis of potential leverage should not become an allegation of a secret deal. But neither should the absence of evidence for a specific bargain end scrutiny of the incentives surrounding future decisions.

    Turkey’s exposure to financial pressure supplies another constraint. A confrontation with Washington can affect investor expectations and the perceived stability of the economy. For any Turkish government, those costs would require consideration. In a system centered on one leader, they may also intersect with concerns about political survival and international acceptance.

    Erdoğan is not without leverage. Turkey’s military capabilities and strategic position give Washington reasons to seek cooperation. His willingness to pursue policies opposed by Western allies also makes blanket descriptions of obedience unconvincing.

    The question is narrower: Can he use Turkey’s assets to negotiate clear limits, or does his reliance on a personal relationship make those limits harder to defend?

    Accountability is essential to answering it.

    Unresolved corruption allegations and politically sensitive financial cases become foreign policy concerns when the public cannot determine whether they influence decisions. Their existence does not prove that a leader is being coerced. The danger arises when independent institutions cannot credibly investigate potential conflicts between the leader’s interests and those of the state.

    Under those conditions even a defensible military decision can become difficult to assess. Citizens cannot know whether their government is responding to a genuine security threat, honoring a clearly defined obligation or protecting a relationship whose full terms remain beyond scrutiny.

    Religious solidarity could further complicate that assessment. A deployment presented as protecting Mecca and Medina would carry emotional force in Turkey. But the protection of holy sites cannot settle questions about command, geographic limits, escalation or withdrawal. Those require specific answers.

    The decisive issue, then, is not Erdoğan’s personal courage in confronting Trump. It is whether Turkey has a decision-making process capable of distinguishing the country’s interests from its president’s needs.

    Before any expanded military commitment, Ankara should explain the threat it intends to address, the limits of its mission and the conditions for ending it. Parliament and the public need enough information to judge those choices.

    Trump may believe Erdoğan will do as he asks. Turkey’s institutions should ensure that belief is never sufficient grounds for sending Turkish soldiers to war.

    *Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

    [OPINION] Corruption behind the mask of religion

     

    When allegations emerged that Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, a former minister and one of the most senior figures in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP,) and her husband had turned a combined investment of about 163 million Turkish lira ($3.3 million) into more than 2 billion lira (about $41 million) in proceeds from stock sales within months, Kaya resigned from her positions in the party.

    The figures were recently disclosed by opposition politician Zeynel Emre.

    Yet while Turkey and the world were watching what has been described as one of the country’s biggest financial scandals, Kaya had been part of Erdoğan’s delegation at the United Nations summit, appearing as though nothing unusual had happened.

    The Kaya couple, who are widely regarded as being close to the Erdoğan family and his political circle, reportedly invested about 163 million lira between them, much of it in Özata Denizcilik shares, beginning in April 2026.

    According to allegations made by New Party spokesperson Emre, Kaya invested about 63.4 million lira ($1.3 million) and later withdrew about 1.34 billion lira ($27.3 million), while her husband, İlyas Kaya, invested about 99.7 million lira ($2 million) and withdrew about 826 million lira ($16.9 million). Emre alleged that they sold their holdings before the financial crisis and market turmoil that erupted in mid-September.

    Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Turkish investors were caught in the collapse. The crisis has affected more than 450,000 investors across 131 funds, with more than $18 billion in assets held in funds now being liquidated.

    The Kaya couple have reportedly transferred approximately 2.2 billion lira ($44.9 million) to an account designated by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance.

    But returning the money does not, by itself, establish that they committed a crime or constitute a legal admission of wrongdoing. Their transactions, their source of information and the circumstances surrounding the trades still require independent investigation.

    Prosecutors have since moved to freeze the assets of Kaya and her husband as part of the fund investigation.

    That raises much bigger questions.

    Why did no one in Erdoğan’s government seriously ask how a senior ruling-party figure and her husband acquired the capital to make such a large investment, why they invested in this particular stock at precisely that time, and how they managed to exit after such a spectacular rise in its value?

    How can a stock rise so dramatically in only a few months without attracting extraordinary scrutiny? And when such extraordinary and potentially manipulative movements occur, why did the institutions responsible for monitoring the stock market and protecting investors fail to intervene earlier?

    These questions are particularly important because the institutions responsible for regulating and overseeing Turkey’s financial markets are headed by people appointed by the government and operating within Erdoğan’s political system.

    And there is an even bigger question.

    How was a crisis involving 131 funds with assets worth more than $18 billion allowed to develop in the first place? Who benefited from the extraordinary price movements now under investigation?

    There is also a striking contrast in the way Erdoğan’s government treats political opponents and figures close to the ruling establishment. Opposition figures, including İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have been arrested and imprisoned amid corruption allegations. In Kaya’s case, prosecutors have now moved to freeze her and her husband’s assets, but neither has been detained or charged over the alleged trades. Where is the same level of scrutiny?

    And why did Kaya remain silent when the allegations first emerged? Her resignation statement said she was stepping aside so the allegations could be investigated independently, but she did not directly address Emre’s detailed claims about the trades.

    If opposition politicians had not publicly disclosed her name and the details of the transactions, would she have voluntarily come forward to explain how she and her husband had allegedly made such extraordinary gains from these trades?

    But perhaps the most painful question is not financial. It is moral.

    Erdoğan, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya and many other figures in the ruling party regularly present themselves to the public through religious language, symbols and imagery.

    What happens to religion when politicians who invoke it so frequently become associated with privilege, extraordinary wealth and allegations of corruption?

    What happens when religious language becomes a political shield against demands for transparency and accountability?

    What does it do to faith when politicians who constantly invoke Islam and religious values are accused of benefiting from extraordinary financial transactions while ordinary citizens bear the losses?

    And do genuinely religious people recognize the damage that this kind of Islamist politics, using religion as a political shield, can inflict on religion itself?

    The AKP’s rise to power was fueled in large part by the sense of grievance created in the 1990s, when Turkey’s secular establishment imposed severe restrictions on women who wore the headscarf, particularly in universities and public institutions.

    Today, however, the AKP has taken the repression it once condemned to a level far beyond what those old regimes imposed on their opponents. And there is a particularly striking irony in the fact that one of the figures now at the center of corruption allegations is herself a woman who wears the headscarf.

    Sadly, this also seems to have vindicated the warnings that Islamist politicians may embrace democracy, justice and freedoms most enthusiastically when they are in opposition. Once they gain power, the temptation can be to treat those principles as instruments rather than universal values.

    Erdoğan himself has long been widely quoted as expressing such an instrumental view of democracy during his years as mayor of İstanbul: “Democracy is like a tram. You ride it until you reach your destination, then you get off.”

    *Abdülhamit Bilici is the former editor-in-chief of the now-defunct Zaman daily who currently lives in exile in Washington, D.C.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute. Turkishminute

  • 2 deputy mayors among 7 jailed in Ankara corruption probe

    2 deputy mayors among 7 jailed in Ankara corruption probe

    A Turkish court on Saturday jailed two deputy mayors and five other people pending trial in a corruption investigation into Ankara’s opposition-run municipality of Etimesgut.

    Deputy Mayors Gültekin Bayındır and Fikret Gözüoğlu were among those jailed, while four other suspects were put under house arrest.

    The court decisions followed the detention of 25 people, five of them municipal employees, in raids across five provinces on October 13.

    Etimesgut, in western Ankara, is governed by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

    The investigation concerns allegations of forged documents and irregularities in municipal contracts, along with improper benefits connected to parking lot leases, zoning decisions and construction permits, according to the Ankara West Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.

    The offenses under investigation range from bribery, embezzlement and extortion by public officials to forming a criminal organization, rigging tenders and misconduct in carrying out public contracts.

    Nine detainees gave statements under provisions offering leniency for cooperation with investigators, while prosecutors requested judicial supervision for five others, according to a prosecution statement carried by state media.

    The court jailed seven of the 11 suspects whose pretrial detention prosecutors had requested, ordering house arrest for the other four.

    The case had already led to the jailing of Etimesgut Mayor Erdal Beşikçioğlu and 39 others pending trial on August 3, following the detention of 55 people on July 30.

    The Interior Ministry suspended Beşikçioğlu from office the day he was jailed.

    Beşikçioğlu, an actor who plays a homicide detective in the television series “Behzat Ç.,” was elected mayor in 2024.

    He has denied wrongdoing, arguing that some of the irregularities cited in audit reports were uncovered through an internal review he ordered.

    He also denied personal or commercial ties to the companies under investigation and maintained that the municipal tenders in question were outside his direct authority.

    CHP candidate Seda Dilber was elected acting mayor by the city council on August 10, with the support of members from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling party, defeating the New Party’s Mehmet Özdemir.

    The New Party was formed in July by former CHP leader Özgür Özel and lawmakers who left the party after a court removed him as chairman.

    The Etimesgut investigation is part of a series of cases targeting opposition-run municipalities following the CHP’s victory over Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the March 2024 local elections.

    Opposition politicians accuse the government of using the investigations to weaken Erdoğan’s rivals and reverse their electoral gains.

  • Turkey detains 32 people over alleged links to Gülen movement

    Turkey detains 32 people over alleged links to Gülen movement

    Turkish authorities have detained 32 people in operations across several provinces over alleged links to the faith-based Gülen movement, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek said Wednesday.

    The operations were part of three investigations launched by prosecutors in Eskişehir and İzmir provinces that targeted 34 people. It was not immediately clear whether any of the detainees had been released or brought before a court.

    In Eskişehir, authorities detained nine of the 10 people included in an investigation into payments made through a US-based company allegedly linked to the Gülen movement. Prosecutors launched the investigation on suspicion that the payments, which were related to food products exported from Turkey, were connected to the movement.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has targeted the faith-based Gülen movement, inspired by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who died in 2024, since corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdoğan as well as some members of his family and inner circle. He dismissed the probes as a Gülenist conspiracy and designated the movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016, intensifying a sweeping crackdown after a coup attempt in July of the same year that he accused Gülen of orchestrating. The movement denies involvement in the coup attempt or any terrorist activity.

    In a separate investigation conducted by the İzmir Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, authorities detained 21 people across four provinces over allegations that they were involved in the Gülen movement’s ongoing activities.

    Prosecutors said the detainees’ names appeared in digital materials seized from people allegedly linked to the movement. Police also seized digital materials and documents during the raids.

    In a third investigation also led by prosecutors in İzmir, authorities detained two people in İzmir and Aydın over allegations of membership in a terrorist organization. A third person included in the investigation was reported to be abroad.

    Prosecutors cited ByLock messages, records from the now-closed Bank Asya and phone records as evidence of alleged links to the movement. ByLock is an encrypted messaging app once widely available on Apple’s App Store and Google Play that Turkish authorities claim was used as a secret communication tool by Gülen supporters.

    In a landmark 2023 ruling in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that convictions based on ByLock use and other alleged Gülen-linked activities, such as having an account at a movement-affiliated bank, violated the rights to a fair trial, no punishment without law and freedom of association.

    Gürlek said the government would continue operations against the Gülen movement and would not tolerate any of its activities.

    According to the latest figures from the justice ministry, more than 127,000 people have been convicted of alleged links to the movement since 2016, with 10,485 still in prison and legal proceedings ongoing against 83,404 individuals.

    This article is republished from the Stockholm Center for Freedom.

  • Flooding brings İstanbul to a standstill as death toll rises to 2

    Flooding brings İstanbul to a standstill as death toll rises to 2

    The death toll from severe flooding in İstanbul rose to two on Thursday as emergency crews continued rescue operations, flights were disrupted and school closures were extended through Friday.

     

    Torrential rain submerged roads, swept away cars and flooded homes and businesses across Turkey’s largest city, home to around 16 million people. Governor Davut Gül said crews had rescued more than 2,700 people.

    A 34-year-old man died after slipping while trying to cross a flooded street in the northern district of Sarıyer. He struck his head on a curb and was unable to get out of the water. Bystanders pulled him out, but he later died in a hospital, the state-run Anadolu news agency reported.

    His death followed the electrocution of a 14-year-old boy Wednesday evening at a park in Balat, a historic neighborhood on the city’s European side. The boy stepped into a pool of water and was taken to a hospital unconscious but could not be saved, the governor’s office said. Investigations were opened into both deaths.

    Emergency teams worked through the night to evacuate people from flooded buildings. Rescue operations were continuing at 14 locations Thursday, while three people remained hospitalized with injuries that were not life-threatening, Gül said.

    Residents unable to return home were being accommodated in hotels and public facilities.

    Rainfall reached 273.1 millimeters — about 10.8 inches — in Beykoz on the Asian side, according to updated municipal figures. That is equivalent to roughly 273 liters of water falling on every square meter of ground. Sarıyer and Eyüpsultan recorded more than 200 millimeters each.

    At İstanbul Airport, 51 incoming flights were diverted and 19 arrivals and departures were canceled, Gül said.

    Schools will remain closed Friday while teams inspect buildings for electrical faults and other hazards.

    Gül urged residents to avoid unnecessary travel, warning that rain was expected to continue for another two to three days and that the ground was already saturated.

    Turkey is highly vulnerable to climate hazards because of its geography, population exposure and reliance on sectors such as agriculture, the World Bank says.

    Global warming intensifies heavy rainfall, while urban expansion and paved surfaces increase runoff and strain drainage systems, according to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

    The flooding comes less than a month before Turkey hosts the COP31 UN climate conference in the Mediterranean city of Antalya from November 9 to 20.https://x.com/AustraliaZaman/status/2110587851167633585